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Re-Regulating the Baby Market:   
A Call for a Ban on Payment of Birth Mother Living Expenses 
Andrea B. Carroll∗ 
 
 About the laudability of a general scheme of domestic adoption, few would disagree.  
Adoption provides a means of building families, hope for children in need, and a stabilizing 
influence for a society searching for aid in caring for its most helpless citizens.1  Still, one need 
not look far to find that the United States’ domestic adoption system is broken.2  Evidence 
pointing toward such a conclusion abounds.  More than half a million children cycle through the 
American foster care system annually, many with little chance of being either reunified with 
their birth families or placed in a permanent adoptive home.3  Even outside the sphere of state-
run care, this country’s domestic adoption scheme fails many of the players involved.  Adoptive 
parents, in particular, often become victims of the flawed scheme of private and agency 
adoption.4  And though it may seem at first blush as though adoptive parents are the member of 
the adoption triad5 least deserving of sympathy, the result of a legal scheme that disfavors 
adoptive parents so substantially is quite troubling.  In 2009 alone, nearly 13,000 children were 
                                                 
∗ C.E. Laborde, Jr. Professor of Law, Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hebert Law Center.  I thank Lucy 
McGough, Shaun Shaughnessy, and the participants at the 2009 Washington and Lee University School of Law 
Children and the Law Workshop for the opportunity to present and receive valuable feedback on an earlier draft of 
this piece.  I am also grateful to the LSU Law Center for its generous research support.  Casey Faucon and Irina Fox 
(LSU Law Center Class of 2010) provided excellent research assistance. 
1 See Karen March, Perception of Adoption as Social Stigma: Motivation for Search and Reunion, 57 J. MARR. & 
FAM. 653, 654 (2005). 
2 See Erika Lynn Kleiman, Caring for Our Own: Why American Adoption Law and Policy Must Change, 30 COLUM. 
J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 327 (1997); Lynn D. Wardle, Parentlessness: Adoption Problems, Paradigms, Policies, and 
Parameters, 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD. & FAM. ADVOC. 323, 352 (2005); Candice M. Zierdt, Compensation for Birth 
Mothers: A Challenge to the Adoption Laws, 23 LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 25, 36 (1991).  
3 Joan R. Rycraft, How to Improve the Likelihood of Successful Family Reunification, in ADOPTION FACTBOOK IV: 
THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE SOURCE FOR ADOPTION STATISTICS NATIONWIDE 351–52 (2007). 
4 See Sale of Children in Interstate and Foreign Commerce: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of 
the Comm. On the Judiciary House of Representatives, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 4 (1977) [hereinafter Hearings]; 
Thomas Jacobs, Rights and Obligations, in 1 CHILDREN & THE LAW § 4.25 (2009) (adoptive family generally 
assumes the financial risks in a domestic adoption); John R. Maley, Wrongful Adoption: Monetary Damages as a 
Superior Remedy to Annulment for Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20 IND. L. REV. 709 (1987). 
5 See Zierdt, supra note 2, at 26 (describing the “adoption triad” as that involving adoptive parents, birth parents, and 
the children to be adopted).   
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adopted from countries outside the United States, the vast majority of those children infants.6  
And while there is every reason to believe that wonderful families were created in these matches, 
the choice of so many American families to avoid domestic adoption is a significant one, because 
it tends to negatively impact the fate of American children in need of adoption. 
 Even a glance at state law on infant adoption quickly illuminates the rationale of adoptive 
parents’ decision to adopt internationally.  Planned domestic adoptions of newborns fail at an 
alarming rate.7  Perhaps more importantly, when such failures occur, adoptive parents find 
themselves out more than just emotion.  Significant monies are nearly always at stake as well.8  
In 1978, renowned law and economics scholar and jurist Richard Posner published an 
article in which he described child adoption as a market activity, essentially a sale or trade 
“realized by a process of voluntary transaction.”9  He went on to catalogue the substantial 
disparity between supply and demand in the adoption context, largely created by government 
prevention of the operation of a legal market for babies.10  Posner opined that this model of 
adoption regulation has led to a black market for babies, and concluded that an experimental 
move toward a free market in adoption may solve the supply and demand mismatch plaguing the 
                                                 
6 See Intercountry Adoption: Office of Children’s Issues, United States Department of State, 
http://adoption.state.gov/news/total_chart.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).    
7 As I intend the phrase here, the failure of a planned adoption includes both a decision by birth parents not to place 
the child with adoptive parents as previously planned, and removal of the child from the adoptive home after 
placement but before the adoption is finalized.  See Katherine Q. Seelye, Specialists Report Rise in Adoptions that 
Fail, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1998, at A14 (stating that there are no exact national statistics available on failed 
adoptions); Susan Scherreik, Adoption: Now There’s the Cyber-Stork, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 14, 2000, at Lifestyle 
(estimating a failure rate of between twenty-five and fifty percent); Dan Gearino, Money, Hope Lost in Failed 
Adoptions, QUAD-CITY TIMES, Feb. 21, 2006, available at  http://www.qctimes.com/news/local/article_4fd32e38-
7947-5759-9d40-8c6f2948e2cc.html (survey conducted by Adopted Families magazine found that twenty-nine 
percent of readers had a failed adoption).  But see Alfred Kadushin & Frederick W. Seidl, Adoption Failure: A 
Social Work Postmortem, in 16 SOCIAL WORK 32, 34 (1971) (arguing that the agency adoption failure rate is 
extremely low).  
8 The total cost of a domestic adoption is frequently as much as $40,000, depending on the circumstances and the 
state of adoption. Child Welfare Information Gateway, Costs of Adopting, 
http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/s_cost/s_costb.cfm (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).   
9 Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 324 (1978).  
10 Id.  
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system.11  Specifically, Posner suggested that adoption agencies take a fee surplus they could 
generate by charging wealthy couples comparatively more for their services and use those profits 
to pay pregnant women considering terminating their pregnancies through abortion to incentivize 
them to instead carry the baby to term and relinquish it for adoption.12  The value of the 
experiment, Posner suggested, would be the creation of data that could help to remedy the supply 
and demand disparity, including figures as to what adoptive parents would be willing to pay for a 
child and just how much money pregnant women would require to carry a baby to term and 
subsequently execute a surrender of parental rights.13 
Posner’s article was exceptionally controversial,14 so much so that pundits speculated it 
may be one of the most significant reasons he could never be successfully nominated to serve as 
a justice of the United States Supreme Court.15  Posner himself felt compelled to defend the 
article even twenty-five years later, noting that he never “advocated ‘baby selling,’” but rather 
argued that state law of the 1970s, which capped the sums which could be paid in connection 
with child adoption at a nominal amount, might be modified experimentally to determine 
whether it would increase the baby supply.16 
Thirty years later, Posner has come startlingly close to getting his wish.  Baby selling is 
still uniformly illegal in the United States,17 but our system of domestic infant adoption is an 
                                                 
11 Id. at 334–46.  
12 Id. at 347–48. 
13 Id. at 348. 
14 See Ronald A. Cass, Coping with Life, Law, and Markets: A Comment on Posner and the Law-and-Economics 
Debate, 67 B.U. L. REV. 73 (1978); Jane M. Cohen, Posnerism, Pluralism, Pessimism, 67 B.U. L. REV. 105 (1987).  
15 Robert S. Boynton, Sounding Off: A Review of Richard Posner’s “Public Intellectuals,” THE WASHINGTON POST 
BOOK WORLD, Jan. 20, 2002, available at http://www.robertboynton.com/articleDisplay.php?article_id=75.  
16 Howard Bashman, How Appealing, http://howappealing.law.com/20q/2003_12_01_20q-
appellateblog_archive.html#107025481874565902 (last visited Feb. 16, 2010).   
17 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-114(C) (West 2007); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-213(1)(a) (West 2005 & 
Supp. 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 928(a) (2006); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.9(1) (West 2001 & Supp. 2008); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2121(a) (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(2) (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
14:286 (West 2004); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54 (West 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-15-23 (West 2008); 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.287(1) (West 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:13(II) (2002 & Supp. 2008); N.Y. 
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exceptionally expensive transaction which comes rather close.18  The typical domestic adoption 
costs roughly $40,000, a substantial sum even when one considers the fees of the agents and 
lawyers involved.19  One of the most significant of the expenses surrounding the domestic 
adoption of a newborn comes not from any of these professional fees,20 however, but rather from 
the payment of living expenses to the expectant mother.21  Adoptive parents typically front these 
monies, under the sanction of state law authorizing such expenditures.22 
 This scheme, under which substantial living expenses are paid to a prospective birth 
mother,23 who makes the ultimate choice to parent her child the vast majority of the time,24 is 
fraught with problems.  Comparisons between baby selling and a scheme allowing for the 
                                                                                                                                                             
SOC. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-10-102(a) (West 2000); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.055(C) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.311(3) (West 2003 & 
Supp. 2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-310(F) (1987 & Supp. 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, §7-105 (2007); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 63.2-1218 (West 2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.64.030(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008) 
(biological parent shall not receive anything of value as a result of adoption unless statute so provides).  See also W. 
MEEZAN, S. KATZ & E. RUSSO, ADOPTIONS WITHOUT AGENCIES: A STUDY OF INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS 182–98 
(1978); Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Bartering for Babies: Are Preconception Agreements in the Best Interests of 
Children?, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 429, 473 (2004) (arguing that preconception agreements also constitute baby selling 
and are void and unenforceable). 
18 See Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59, 71 (1987) (legal scheme 
allowing the payment of substantial sums to birth mothers is really a sale in disguise). But see Zierdt, supra note 2, 
at 44 (compensating birth mothers is not baby selling).  
19 Child Welfare Information Gateway, Costs of Adopting, http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/s_cost/s_costb.cfm 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2010).  It is not at all uncommon for complicated domestic adoptions to approach $100,000.  
Laura Mansnerus, Market Puts Price Tags on the Priceless: How Bundles of Joy Not for Sale are Sold, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 28, 1998 at A1.   
20 The professional fees for adoption are typically limited to a single day in court and a single day of lawyer 
resources. Thomas Jacobs, Adoption: Fees and Expenses, 1 CHILDREN & THE LAW: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS § 
4:26 (2009). 
21 See generally Gearino, supra note 7; Melinda Lucas, Adoption: Distinguishing Between Gray Market and Black 
Market Activities, 34 FAM. L.Q. 553, 556 (2000); Ryan Mills, Woman Fakes Pregnancy in Adoption Scam, 
SCRIPPSNEWS, Aug. 1, 2008, available at http://www.scrippsnews.com/node/35187/12187. 
22 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(1)(d) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-135 (West 1984); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203 (West 1990).  
23 Some have argued against the use of terms such as “birth family,” “birth parent,” and “birth mother,” arguing that 
they are imbued with negative connotations. See John Lawrence Hill, What Does It Mean to Be a “Parent?” The 
Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353, 357 (1991).  Nonetheless, this author 
uses these terms to describe the biological parents of the adopted child as the phrases are still the most well-
recognized and accepted labels for these groups. 
24 It is estimated that as many as eighty percent of pregnant women who work with adoption agencies and attorneys 
to select a placement for their unborn child decide to parent the child instead of going through with the adoptive 
placement.  Laura Mansnerus, Market Puts Price Tags on the Priceless: How Bundles of Joy Not for Sale are Sold, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1998 at A1.   
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payment of substantial sums for housing or other expenses of daily life are almost inescapable.25  
Questions about the voluntariness of a birth mother’s surrender arise in connection with the 
payment of living expenses and are more weighty than the concerns present for any other type of 
adoption-related expense.26  Moreover, birth mothers often actually profit from the payment of 
their living expenses, necessarily raising the same concerns which have been used to justify a 
ban on baby selling.27  Perhaps worst is that because not all birth mothers are similarly valued, 
allowing prospective adoptive parents to pay birth mother living expenses serves to injure 
society as a whole by striating race and class divisions. 
 Part I of this article describes the varying approaches states have taken to regulation of 
housing payments and other similar expenses in connection with child adoption.  State laws 
allowing virtually unfettered payment of actual living expenses and state bans on all such 
payments, along with solutions on the continuum between these two, are explored.  Part II details 
the harms of existing state rules sanctioning the payment of birth mother living expenses by 
prospective adoptive parents, including a discussion of the slippery slope that separates the 
                                                 
25 “Baby selling” is generally statutorily defined as the giving or receiving of anything of value in exchange for the 
consent to or placement of a child for adoption. See e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) (West 2008) (“It is a 
misdemeanor for any person or agency to pay, offer to pay, or to receive money or anything of value for the 
placement for adoption or for the consent to an adoption of a child.”).  Certainly, housing payments would be 
construed as a “thing of value.”  
26 See Hearings, supra note 4, at 13; Katy Ruth Klinke, The Baby M Controversy: A Class Distinction, 18 OKLA. 
CITY U. L. REV. 113, 118–19 (1993). See generally Jonathan M. Purver, Undue Influence in Obtaining Parent’s 
Consent to Adoption of Child, 8 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 481 (2009) (describing public policies implicated by 
the use of coercion in obtaining consent to relinquish a child).      
27 Baby selling is against public policy because it preys on a financially subordinate birth mother, providing 
monetary incentive to relinquish her parenting rights. See Matthew H. Baughman, In Search of Common Ground: 
One Pragmatist Perspective on the Debate Over Contract Surrogacy, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 263, 271–72 
(2001) (“when poor people try to sell their organs or poor women sell their bodies for sex, they may be engaging in 
the transaction out of brute necessity, and not because they have made a rational choice from a position of equal 
bargaining power”); Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Beyond the Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty: Judicial Decision-
Making in a Polynomic World, 53 RUTGERS L. REV. 781, 820 (2001) (“baby-selling . . . [is] not permitted in decent 
market societies perhaps because it seems hard to believe that any normal person would sell their baby . . . except 
under duress, that is, when faced with a set of choices that no one should have to face”).  Allowing the payment birth 
mother living expenses raises the same concerns – the payments incentivize a birth mother to relinquish her parental 
rights in exchange for a more comfortable standard of living.  See also Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption Law, in 3 
THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN: ADOPTION 49 (1993) (characterizing adoption as a donative transaction which is not 
supposed to generate financial gain). 
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payment of expenses from baby selling, the potential for serious questions regarding the 
voluntariness of the birth mother’s surrender of her child, the likely discouragement of 
prospective adoptive parents from pursuing domestic adoption, and the misplacement of the 
burden of supporting society’s most needy citizens.  Part III concludes by calling for a change 
from prevalent models of regulation to an outright ban on the payment of living expenses.  Such 
a change is important, even necessary, because it is not merely the financial fate of adoptive 
parents at stake.  Rather, the future of American children, and ultimately, the welfare of our 
society, could be affected significantly by improvement of our domestic adoption scheme. 
I. STATE LAW ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION OF LIVING EXPENSE PAYMENTS 
 
At least one thing regarding the financial implications of child adoption is clear. The 
American states, along with their international counterparts,28 uniformly prohibit—even 
criminalize—the practice of baby selling.29  Express prohibitions, typically found in the form of 
criminal statutes, exist in thirty-two states,30 and at least fourteen states have jurisprudence 
                                                 
28 See Hague Conference on Private International Law: Final Act of the Seventeenth Session, Including the 
Convention on Protection of Children and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, 
http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=69 (last visited Feb. 23, 2010) [hereinafter Hague 
Conference] (articulating an international policy for the protection of children during inter-country adoption). 
29 See MEEZAN, KATZ & RUSSO, supra note 17, at 182; Browne-Barbour, supra note 17, at 473. 
30 See ALA. CODE § 26-10A-34 (1992); CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a) (West 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-
213(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.212(1)(c) (West 2005 & Supp. 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 
19-8-24 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1511 (2006); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9(a) (West 
2004 & Supp. 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.9(1)(c) (West 2001 & Supp. 2008); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.493(2) 
(West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:286 (West 2004); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-603(a) (West 2002); 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § 11(A) (West 2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54(1) (West 1995); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 259.55 (West 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-15-23(5) (West 2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 568.175(1) 
(West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-7-105(3) (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.288(2) (West 2008); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 9:3-39.1(d) (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 389(2) (McKinney 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 48-10-102(b) (West 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-05 (1997 & Supp. 2005); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, 
§ 866 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4305 (West 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1060 
(1987 & Supp. 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-6-4.1 (2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-109 (West 2002 & Supp. 
2008); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.08(b) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203 (West 2004 
& Supp. 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1218 (West 2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.64.030(3) (West 2000 & 
Supp. 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-803 (West 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.24 (West 2008 & Supp. 2008). 
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decrying the practice.31  For more than fifty years, the practice of baby selling has been rather 
strongly and uniformly disapproved in this country.32   
Yet it’s no secret that money changes hands in child adoption.33  In fact, the cost of infant 
and toddler adoption outside the state-run foster care system is staggering, with a number of 
players taking a cut.34  Lawyers are paid handsomely to serve as baby brokers; agencies facilitate 
adoptions for handsome sums.35  And despite the prohibition on baby selling, state laws 
                                                 
31 See People v. Daniel, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3 (Cal. App. 3d 1987) (defendant convicted of “sale of a person” for 
demanding $90,000 in exchange for consent to the adoption of his seventeen-month-old daughter); Adoption House, 
Inc. v. P.M., 2003 WL 23354141 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2003) (improper payment of living expenses in connection with 
adoption); Douglas v. State, 438 S.E.2d 361 (Ga. 1994) (offer of automobile in exchange for the biological mother’s 
consent to adoption violated statute making it unlawful to induce parents to part with their children); In re Kindgren, 
540 N.E.2d 485 (Ill. App. 1989) (consent fraudulently obtained where adoptive parents paid birth mother $10,000 to 
cover medical expenses without being aware of what the expenses were); In re Adoption of Baby Boy M., 18 P.3d 
304 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001) (trial court erred in ordering adoptive parents to reimburse Medicaid for payments for 
birth mother’s expenses where no law requires them to do so); State v. Roberts, 471 So. 2d 900 (La. App. 2d Cir. 
1985) (biological mother violated statute by traveling to Texas to relinquish her son for sum of $3,000); State v. 
Runkles, 605 A. 2d 111 (Md. 1992) (mother persuaded by her boyfriend to relinquish child to boyfriend’s father for 
$4,000 did not violate statute as mother did not know of payment); Doe v. Kelly, 307 N.W.2d 438 (Mich.  
Ct. App. 1981); Balouch v. State, 938 So. 2d 253 (Miss. 2006) (defendant violated statute by offering to relinquish 
her child for $5,000); State v. Daugherty, 744 S.W.2d 849 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (defendant guilty of trafficking of 
children for offering to pay $1,000 for the purposes of adoption of a child); Gray v. Maxwell, 293 N.W.2d 90 (Neb. 
1980) (relinquishment of a child done in consideration of promise to pay a sum of money in excess of legitimate 
expenses against public policy); Matter of Adoption of Stephen, 645 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1996) (living 
expenses paid to birth mother and rent by adoption agency violated statute); In re Adoption of Baby Boy P., 700 
N.Y.S.2d 792 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1999) (reducing excessive agency fees and disallowing both attorney fees for services 
provided to the natural father and car maintenance expenses); Matter of Adoption of Alyssa, L.B., 501 N.Y.S.2d 595 
(N.Y. Sur. 1986) (expenses limited to those incidental to birth and care of adoptive child, pregnancy or care of 
adoptive child’s mother, or placement of child, not including automobile for birth mother); In re Adoption of P.E.P., 
407 S.E.2d 505 (N.C. 1991) (payment of fees including travel expenses, medical expenses of the parent, six month 
lease of an apartment, weekly stipend for three months, and attorney fees violated statute); In re Baby Girl D., 517 
A.2d 925 (Pa. 1986) (allowing adoptive parents to pay only expenses related to care of child); DeJesus v. State, 889 
S.W.2d 373 (Tex. App. 1994) (defendant convicted of the sale of a child because over $10,000 in payments were 
made outside of the confines of the statute); Thacker v. State, 889 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (mother and 
attorney violated statute when attorney paid mother a total of $12,000 for her five children).  
32 See, e.g., New York ex rel. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 195 N.Y.S.2d 1009 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959); Hearings, 
supra note 4. 
33 See Maggie Jackson, Aspiring Adoptive Parents Face Greed, Competition, Exploitation Society, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 
23, 1995, at A1. 
34See Child Welfare Information Gateway, Costs of Adopting, http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/s_cost/s_costb.cfm 
(last visited Feb. 16, 2010).   
35 State laws generally permit agencies to charge service fees for each adoption they facilitate.  See ALA. CODE § 26-
10-4.1 (1992); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 928(b) (2006); D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-1410 (2008); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 525/1 (West 2003 & Supp. 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2121(a) (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(2) 
(West 2006); LA. CH. CODE ANN. art. 1200(B) (West 2004); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-362(b) (West 2006); 
MONT. CODE ANN. § 452-7-101(1) (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.275 (West 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
170-B:13(1) (2002 & Supp. 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39.1(e) (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 
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generally sanction the payment of a rather broad variety of fees in connection with an adoptive 
placement.36 
 Among those approved payments are agency or lawyer fees for making the match 
between the prospective adoptive parents and the birth family and otherwise facilitating the 
adoption,37 medical expenses associated with the pregnancy and birth of the child38 as well as 
                                                                                                                                                             
32A-5-34(B) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2009); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-10-103(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.055(C) (West 2005 & 
Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-3-2 (West 2007); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2533(d) (West 2001); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-310(F) (1987 & Supp. 2007); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 7-104 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 
63.2-1218 (West 2002); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-803 (West 2002). An attorney may be paid additional fees by 
the adoptive family for services in connection with an adoption. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-114(D) (2007); 
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-213(1)(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.097(2) (West 2005); LA. 
CH. CODE ANN. art. 1200(B) (West 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-15-23(4) (West 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
170-B:13(1) (2002 & Supp. 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-10-103(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 14-15-10(1) (2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.055(C) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 2533(d) (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-310(F) (1987 & Supp. 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-109 
(West 2002 & Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-
803 (West 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.913(1) (West 2008 & Supp. 2008). 
36 In many states, it is permissible for adoptive parents to pay for medical expenses, hospital expenses, maternity 
clothing, legal fees, prenatal care, counseling and mental examinations,  placement fees, and any court costs relating 
to the birth of the child they intend to adopt. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10-4.1 (1992); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-
114(A) (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-728c (West 2004).    
37 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 928(b) (2006) (service fee may be charged by an adoption agency “for each 
adoption in an amount not exceeding the cost of services rendered, to be paid by the adopting parent or parents”); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2121(a) (2005) (“Except as otherwise authorized by law, no person shall request, receive, 
give or offer to give any consideration in connection with an adoption, or a placement for adoption, other than (1) 
reasonable fees for legal and other professional services rendered in connection with the placement or adoption not 
to exceed customary fees for similar services by professionals of equivalent experience and reputation where the 
services are performed . . . (2) reasonable fees in the state of Kansas of a licensed child-placing agency”). 
38 See ALA. CODE § 26-10-4.1 (1992); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-114(A) (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-221(a) 
(West 2002); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8610(a) (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.097(2) (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 
19-8-13(c) (West 2003); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1511 (2006); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 525/4 (West 2003 & 
Supp. 2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2121(a) (2005); 
LA. CH. CODE ANN. art. 1200(B) (West 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §9-306(a) (1998); MD. CODE ANN., 
FAM. LAW § 5-362(b) (West 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54(5) (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.55 
(West 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-15-23(4) (West 2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.075(1) (West 2003); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 42-7-101(1) (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.287(3) (West 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-
B:13(1) (2002 & Supp. 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39.1(e) (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-
34(B) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 48-10-103(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-10(1) (2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
3107.055(C) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-3.2 (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
109.311(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2533(d) (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-
310(F) (1987 & Supp. 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-109 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 
25.08(b) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 15A, § 7-103(a) (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1218 (West 2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.64.030(2) 
(West 2000 & Supp. 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-803(e) (West 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.913(1) (West 
2008 & Supp. 2008).  
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expenses associated with procuring the required mental health counseling for relinquishing birth 
mothers,39 legal fees for completing the adoption paperwork and judicial proceedings,40 and 
expenses for care of the child between birth and placement.41  Such fees are routinely accepted as 
permissible, even in states prohibiting the payment of “anything of value” in connection with the 
placement of a child for adoption.42  The central idea behind the allowance of such expenses, 
                                                 
39 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-114(A) (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-728 (West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 
35-46-1-9(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); LA. CH. CODE ANN. art. 1200(B) (West 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
18-A, § 9-306(a) (1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54(5) (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.55 (West 
2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-15-117(4) (West 2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.075(1) (West 2003); MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 42-7-101(1) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:13(1) (2002 & Supp. 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-
39.1(e) (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-34(B) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 48-10-103(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-3.2 (West 2007); 23 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 2533(d) (West 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-109 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. § 25.08(b) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15A, § 7-103(a) (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1218 (West 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.913(1) (West 
2008 & Supp. 2008). 
40 See ALA. CODE § 26-10-4.1 (1992); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-114(A) (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-221(a) 
(West 2002); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-213(1)(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 928(b) 
(2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.097(2) (West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1515(1) (2006); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 525/4.1(g) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2121(a) (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
199.590(6) (West 2006); LA. CH. CODE ANN. art. 1200(B) (West 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-306(a) 
(1998); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-362(b) (West 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54(5) (West 1995); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.55 (West 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-15-117(4) (West 2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 
453.075(1) (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-7-101(1) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:13(1) (2002 & 
Supp. 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39.1(e) (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-34(B) (West 
2003 & Supp. 2008); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-
10-103(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-10(1) (2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
3107.055(C) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-3.2 (West 2007); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 2533(d) (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-310(F) (1987 & Supp. 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-109 
(West 2002 & Supp. 2008); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.08(b) (Vernon 2003 & Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-7-203 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 7-103(a) (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1218 
(West 2002); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.64.030(2) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-
803(e) (West 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.913(1) (West 2008 & Supp. 2008). 
41 See ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.090(a) (2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-133 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-221(a) 
(West 2002); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8610(a) (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.097(2) (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 
19-8-13(c) (West 2003); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 525/1 (West 2003 & Supp. 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.9(2) 
(West 2001 & Supp. 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2121(a) (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(6) (West 2006); 
LA. CH. CODE ANN. art. 1200(B) (West 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-306(a) (1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 259.55 (West 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-7-101(1) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:13(1) (2002 & 
Supp. 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-34(B) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-10-103(e) 
(West 2000 & Supp. 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-10(1) (2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.055(C) (West 
2005 & Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-3.2 (West 2007); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2533(d) (West 
2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-310(F) (1987 & Supp. 2007); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.08(b) (Vernon 2003 & 
Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 7-103(a) (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1218 (West 2002); W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 48-22-803(e) (West 2002).  
42 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-114(G) (2007) (prohibiting compensation for consenting to place a child for 
adoption). But see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §  9-114(A) (2007) (allowing a court to approve any reasonable and 
necessary expenses incurred in connection with the adoption, including costs for medical and hospital care and 
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even in view of a widespread prohibition on baby selling, is that these expenses are necessary 
and direct consequences of the birth and placement of the child,43 which should be a financially 
neutral transaction for any birth parent willing to make the difficult choice of concluding a 
pregnancy by placing the child for adoption.44 
 One possible payment stands out from these others, however, as more controversial and 
worthy of additional scrutiny—namely, the payment of birth parent living expenses during the 
period of pregnancy and perhaps even for some period after the birth of the child.  The vast 
majority of states allow prospective adoptive parents, and the agencies and lawyers with whom 
they work to facilitate adoptions, to pay the rent, utilities, and other housing-related expenses of 
birth parents.45  Indeed, only five states forbid—either legislatively or judicially—all such 
                                                                                                                                                             
examinations for the mother and child, counseling fees, legal fees, agency fees, living expenses, and any other costs 
the court finds reasonable and necessary). See also IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008) 
(establishing the transfer of property for consent to adoption as a Class D felony). But see IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-
1-9(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008) (allowing payment for attorney’s fees, hospital and medical, agency fees, birth 
parent counseling, costs of housing, utilities, phone service, or any additional itemized necessary living expense for 
birth mother during the second or third trimester of pregnancy and not more than six weeks after birth, maternity 
clothing, travel expenses that relate to the pregnancy or adoption, and actual wages lost).   
43 Douglas H. Reiniger, Ethical Considerations in Representing Birth Parents: Regulation of Adoption Expenses, 
211 PLI/Crim 183, 185 (2007).  
44 See Academy of California Adoption Lawyers, http://www.acal.org/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2010). The Academy of 
California Adoption Lawyers describes payments from adoptive parents to birth parents as for the purpose of 
making adoption a “financially neutral option for the birth mother,” rather than a money-making opportunity. See 
also Jennifer L. Watson, Growing a Baby for Sale or Merely Renting a Womb: Should Surrogate Mothers be 
Compensated for Their Services?, 6 WHITTIER J. CHILD. & FAM. ADVOC. 529, 539 (2007); Hearings, supra note 4, at 
17–18 (testimony of William Acosta); Zierdt, supra note 2, at 62. 
45 See ALA. CODE § 26-10-4.1 (1992); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-114(A) (2007); CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(b) (West 
2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-728c (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.097(2) (West 2005); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 16-1515(1) (2006); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 525/4.1(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-
46-1-9(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.9(2) (West 2001 & Supp. 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 
59-2121(a) (2005); LA. CH. CODE ANN. art. 1200(B) (West 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-306(a) 
(1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54(3) (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.55 (West 2007); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 43-15-117(4) (West 2008); MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.075(1) (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-7-101(1) 
(2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.287(3) (West 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:13(1) (2002 & Supp. 
2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39.1 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-34(B) (West 2003 & Supp. 
2008); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-10-103(a) 
(West 2000 & Supp. 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-10(1) (2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.055 (West 2005 
& Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-3.2 (West 2007); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2533(d) (West 
2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-310(F) (1987 & Supp. 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-109 (West 2002 & Supp. 
2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 7-103(a) (2007); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 63.2-1218 (West 2002); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.913(1) (West 2008 & Supp. 2008).   
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payments.46  Still, state law varies rather significantly when it comes to precisely what living 
expenses can permissibly be covered by adoptive parents without crossing the line into an illegal 
child sale.  Models of state regulation vary from allowance of these payments without restriction 
to a complete ban, but tend to center around more moderate schemes, including sanctioning only 
the payment of “reasonable” living expenses, capping these expenses at a specific dollar amount, 
or providing numerically unlimited payments, but only for a very short window of time 
surrounding the birth of the child.47 
                                                 
46 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-213(1)(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 928(a) 
(2006); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-362(a) (West 2006); DeJesus v. State of Texas, 889 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. App. 
1994); Thacker v. State of Texas, 889 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. App. 1994); In re Baby Girl D., 517 A. 2d 925 (Pa. 1986). 
47 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-728c (West 2004) (living expenses allowed up to $1,500); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
63.097(2) (West 2005) (reasonable living expenses allowed for up to six weeks post-partum); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 
18-1511 ( West 2010) (living expenses allowed during pregnancy and for period not to exceed six weeks post-
partum); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 525/4.1(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009) (reasonable living expenses allowed for 
no more than 120 days prior to birth mother’s expected date of delivery and for no more than sixty days after birth 
of child); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008) (living expenses allowed during second or 
third trimester of pregnancy and not more than six weeks after childbirth, not to exceed $1000); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
600.9(2) (West 2001 & Supp. 2008) (living expenses allowed for no longer than thirty days after birth); KAN. STAT. 
ANN. § 59-2121(a) (2005) (reasonable living expenses allowed if incurred as a result of the pregnancy); LA. CH. 
CODE ANN. art. 1200(B) (West 2004) (living expenses allowed for a reasonable time before birth and for no more 
than forty-five days after birth); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-306(a) (1998) (living expenses for biological 
mother and father allowed); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54(3) (West 1995) (living expenses allowed for birth 
mother before birth and for no more than six weeks after birth); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.55 (West 2007) (reasonable 
living expenses allowed if needed to maintain an adequate standard of living that birth mother is unable to otherwise 
maintain); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-15-117(4) (West 2008) (mother’s reasonable living expenses allowed); MO. ANN. 
STAT. § 453.075(1) (West 2003) (living expenses allowed if within the norms of the community in which the birth 
mother resides); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-7-101(1) (2007) (temporary living costs for birth mother allowed); NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.287(3) (West 2008) (necessary living expenses related to birth of the child allowed); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:13(1) (2002 & Supp. 2008) (living expenses allowed if necessary to maintain an adequate 
standard of living that birth mother is otherwise unable to maintain); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39.1(e) (West 2002 & 
Supp. 2008) (living expenses of birth mother allowed during period of pregnancy and for period not to exceed four 
weeks after termination of pregnancy); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-34(B) (West 2009) (living expenses of birth 
mother and dependent children allowed for a reasonable time before birth or placement of the adoptee and for no 
more than six weeks after  birth or placement of the adoptee); N.Y, SOC. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 2009) 
(reasonable and actual expenses for housing allowed for a reasonable time not to exceed sixty days prior to birth and 
latter of thirty days after birth or thirty days after parental consent to adoption); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-10-
103(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008) (ordinary living expenses of birth mother allowed during pregnancy and for no 
more than six weeks after birth); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-10(1) (2004) (living expenses allowed if needed to 
maintain an adequate standard of living that birth mother is unable to otherwise maintain); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
3107.055(C) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008) (living expenses of birth mother allowed not to exceed $3,000 incurred 
during pregnancy through the sixtieth day after minor’s birth); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-3.2 (West 2007) 
(reasonable living expenses allowed if incurred during adoption planning process or during pregnancy not to exceed 
two months after birth of minor or after consent of birth mother); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2533(d) (West 2001) 
(living expenses of birth mother allowed for reasonable time before birth and for no more than six weeks after birth); 
S.C. CODE ANN. §63-9-310(F) (1987 & Supp. 2007) (reasonable living expenses allowed for a reasonable period of 
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A. The Gold Card:  Expenses without Limitation  
In view of the general state law prohibition on baby selling, no state’s statute sanctions 
the payment of birth parent living expenses and expressly describes those permissible expenses 
as unlimited.  Rather, states sanctioning adoptive parent payment of birth parent living expenses 
often describe permissible payments in very general terms, such as those “related to the 
placement of the child.”48  Even when living expenses are expressly mentioned by statute, the 
trend is to stop at saying simply that such expenses may be paid to birth parents without running 
afoul of state law criminalizing sales the object of which is a human being.49  Still, jurisprudence 
in a number of states indicates that courts are often willing to allow substantial, even unfettered, 
expenditures for living, so long as the expenses were actually incurred by the birth family.50 
B. “Reasonableness” and “Necessity” Limitations  
Far more common than statutes without any express boundaries for the payment of living 
expenses are state statutes which specifically sanction prospective adoptive parents’ payment of 
                                                                                                                                                             
time); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-109 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008) (reasonable and actual expenses allowed for 
housing for a reasonable period not to exceed ninety days prior to or forty-five days after birth or surrender or 
parental consent to adoption); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008) (temporary living expenses 
during pregnancy or confinement allowed); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 7-103(a) (2007) (living expenses of mother 
allowed for reasonable time before birth and for no more than six weeks after birth); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1218 
(West 2002) (reasonable and necessary expenses for shelter allowed when birth mother unable to support herself); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.913(1) (West 2008 & Supp. 2008) (living expenses of birth mother allowed, not to exceed 
$5,000, only to protect welfare of birth mother or fetus).  
48 See e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.090(a) (2007) (adoptive parents must file report showing any expenses incurred in 
connection with the birth of the minor, placement of the minor with petitioner, medical or hospital care received by 
the mother or by the minor during the mother’s prenatal care and confinement, and services relating to the adoption 
or to the placement of the minor for adoption that were received by or on behalf of the petitioner, either natural 
parent of the minor, or any other person); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-211(a) (West 2002) (petitioner in a proceeding for 
adoption shall file a full accounting showing any expenses in connection with the birth of the child and placement 
for adoption); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(6) (West 2006) (a listing of expenses of the biological parent or 
parents for any purpose related to the adoption allowed may be submitted for the court’s approval or modification).   
49 See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-306(a) (1998) (living expenses for the biological mother and child and for 
the biological father allowed); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-15-117(4) (West 2008) (nothing precluding the payment of 
mother’s living expenses); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.311(1) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008) (living expenses related to 
the adoption). 
50 See Brod v. Matter of an Adoption, 522 So. 2d 973 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (intermediary may properly pay on 
behalf of adoptive parents the documented living expenses of a birth mother). See generally JACOBS, supra note 4, § 
4.25 (describing state law as generally allowing for the payment of living expenses).  
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birth parent living expenses only when such expenses are “reasonable” or “necessary.”  At least 
twenty-one states adopt such a rule.51  State law varies widely on the issue of what is reasonable 
and necessary, with some states providing no statutory guidance as to the meaning of the terms 
in this context.52  Moreover, the timing of the reasonableness determination has a significant 
impact on the effectiveness of the rule in weeding out baby sales.  Ironically, most states 
adopting a reasonableness or necessity test to review the propriety of expense payments select 
the time at which rational decisions about expense propriety are least likely to be made—namely, 
at finalization hearings.53  Other states provide for a determination of reasonableness or necessity 
at some earlier time.54 
1.   The Meat of the Rule:  What Expenses Are Reasonable or Necessary? 
Arizona gives what perhaps is the best guidance as to the substantive limitations of 
reasonableness or necessity rules.  State statutes there specifically provide that in assessing living 
                                                 
51 See ALA. CODE § 26-10-4.1 (1992); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-114(A) (2007); CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(b) (West 
2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.097(2) (West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1515(1) (2006); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 525/4.1(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 59-2121(a) (2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54(3) (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.55 
(West 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-15-117(4) (West 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-7-101(1) (2007); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 127.287(3) (West 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:13(1) (2002 & Supp. 2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. 
§ 32A-5-34(B) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-3.2 (West 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
63-9-310(F) (1987 & Supp. 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-109 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-7-203 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 7-103(a) (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1218 
(West 2002).  
52 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-114(A) (2007); CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(b) (West 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
2121(a) (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-306(a) (1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54(3) (West 
1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-7-101(1) (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.287(3) (West 2008); S.C. CODE ANN. 
§ 63-9-310(F) (1987 & Supp. 2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
15A, § 7-103(a) (2007). 
53 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-114(B) (2007); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8610(a) (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.132 
(West 2005 & Supp. 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1515 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54(7) (West 
1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 453.075(1) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:19(V) (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 
32A-5-34(A) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-3.2(A) (West 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
63-9-740 (1987 & Supp. 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-116(b) (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78B-6-140 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 3-702 (2007).  
54 See e.g., ALA. CODE § 26-10A-23(a) (1992) (prior to paying, adoptive parents must submit to the court a full 
accounting of all charges for expenses); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-114(B) (2007) (if living expenses exceed $1000, 
the adoptive parents must obtain court approval prior to payment); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 525/4.1(e) (West 
2003 & Supp. 2009) (within fourteen days of the payment of living expenses, the adoptive parents must file a 
financial accounting report with the court). 
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expense payments, courts are to consider “the current standard of living of the birth parent, the 
standard of living necessary to preserve the health and welfare of the birth parent and the unborn 
child, and the existence of alternative financial resources for the birth parent.”55   
 New Hampshire and Minnesota get at similar issues, but describe permissible living 
expense payments in terms of loss of the birth parent’s ability to be fully employed for some 
period of the pregnancy.56  Both states’ statutes define necessary expenses as those required to 
maintain the birth mother in the standard of living to which she is accustomed, but is unable to 
maintain because of loss of income or other support resulting from her pregnancy.  The 
reasonableness and necessity inquiry in these states, then, is strongly tied to lost wages.  Living 
expenses are essentially intended as a substitute for the lost wages, which come about as a result 
of the birth mother’s decision to carry the baby to term.57 
2. Procedural Hindrances:  When is Reasonableness and Necessity Determined? 
 
Even setting aside state law variations as to the meaning of reasonable or necessary in the 
living expenses context, there are substantially divergent applications of these rules as a result of 
procedural considerations.  Essentially, the question is one of the timing of a reasonableness or 
necessity finding. 
 If the purpose of imposing a limitation on permissible living expense payments is to 
shield adoptions from perceived impropriety—essentially to persuasively rebuff serious charges 
of baby selling while still fostering the practice of adoption—then one might expect the 
determination of reasonableness or necessity to be made early on.  Ideally, all parties involved in 
                                                 
55 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-114(B) (2007). 
56 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:13(I) (2002 & Supp. 2008) (“living expenses of the birth mother which are 
necessary to maintain an adequate standard of living, which the birth mother is unable to otherwise maintain because 
of loss of income or other support resulting from the pregnancy and lost wages resulting from the pregnancy or 
delivery”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.55 (West 2007) (“reasonable living expenses of the birth mother which are 
needed to maintain an adequate standard of living which the birth mother is unable to otherwise maintain because of 
loss of income or other support relating from the pregnancy”). 
57 Douglas R. Donnelly, Family Law, in  CALIFORNIA TRANSACTION FORMS § 6:20 (2003).  
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the triad, most particularly the potential adoptive parents, need to know what monies can 
permissibly change hands before any payments are made.  Indeed, one New York court advised 
attorneys involved in child adoptions to obtain court approval before making expenditures 
related to birth mothers’ pregnancies.58  Unfortunately, such a solution is impracticable.  Courts 
are not generally permitted to issue advisory opinions,59 and at the stage when a prospective 
adoptive parent would need approval of living expenses yet to be paid, there would be no court 
proceeding.60  A judicial proceeding related to an adoption is begun only by petition61 after the 
birth and consent of the birth parents to the adoption.62  Thus, no case or controversy exists 
before the birth of the child—when a prospective adoptive parent truly needs a judicial 
determination of reasonableness or necessity.63 
 The importance of this procedural posture for determining whether living expenses are 
reasonable is significant because it serves to undermine the effectiveness of the reasonableness 
rule in preserving the integrity of adoptions as a financially neutral transaction.64  The rules on 
advisory opinions, which prohibit judges from granting advance authorization for adoption-
related payments, essentially place the question of propriety before the judge for the first time at 
the finalization hearing—when the child has likely already lived with the potential adoptive 
parents for a period of six months or a year.65  Clearly, the judges’ options are limited in such 
                                                 
58 In the Matter of Adoption of Baby Boy M.G., 515 N.Y.S.2d 198 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1987). 
59 For a discussion of the federal doctrine prohibiting advisory opinions, and state law exceptions to it, see Note, 
Jonathan D. Persky, “Ghosts that Slay”:  A Contemporary Look at State Advisory Opinions, 37 CONN. L. REV. 1155 
(2005). 
60 See In the Matter of Adoption of Stephen, a minor, 645 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1996). 
61 See e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2128 (2005).  
62 Id., at (a)(3) (2005); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2128(f) (2005). 
63 See generally Lucas, supra note 21, at 559 (arguing for earlier judicial determination of permissible living 
expense payments).  
64 See Academy of California Lawyers, supra note 44 (payments from adoptive parents to birth parents are to make 
adoption a financially neutral option for the birth mother rather than a money-making opportunity). 
65 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-114(B) (2007); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8610(a) (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.132 
(West 2005 & Supp. 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1515 (2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54(7) (West 
1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 453.075(1) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:19(V) (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 
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scenarios.  Refusing to grant the petition to finalize the adoption would be almost 
unconscionable,66 yet state law limiting a court’s ability to order a birth parent to reimburse 
excessive fees may provide a judge no other “sanction” for the payment of living expenses that 
are not reasonable or necessary.67  The trend, then, is that the inquiry conducted at this stage is 
not truly a serious one,68 which undermines the structure of the rule itself as a means of ensuring 
that adoption does not become baby selling.  
                                                                                                                                                             
32A-5-34(A) (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-3.2(A) (West 2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
63-9-740 (1987 & Supp. 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-116(b) (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78B-6-140 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 3-702 (2007) (accounting must be filed prior to 
the date set for the hearing on the adoption petition). See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-213 (West 2002) (final decree 
of adoption may not be issued until the minor has lived in the petitioner’s home for at least six months); Nev. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 127.127 (West 2008) (adoptive parents must file an accounting report within fifteen days after the 
petition for adoption is filed or within five months after the child begins to live in their home) (emphasis added).  
66 See Matter of the Adoption of Male Infant A., 578 N.Y.S.2d 988, 994 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991) (“In denying an 
adoption for violation of the adoption laws, a child may be deprived of the only home he or she has ever known and 
returned to a natural parent marginally capable of providing care for the child or placed into foster care.”). Courts 
are reluctant to deny finalization of adoptions due to violations of the adoption laws regarding payment of expenses. 
See In re Welfare of K.T., 327 N.W.2d 13, 18 (Minn. 1982); Matter of Tersigni by Carballo, 521 N.Y.S.2d 375 
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1987); Matter of Juan P.H.C., 496 N.Y.S.2d 630 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1985).  
67 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.55(2) (West 2007) (“A contract purporting to require a birth parent to reimburse a 
prospective adoptive parent for [living expenses] under any circumstances . . . is void as against public policy.”); 
MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.075(2) (West 2003) (the court’s only option if it finds that any payments were unreasonable 
is to decline to issue the decree of adoption); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-7-105(4) (2007) (“It is illegal to require 
repayment or reimbursement of anything provided to a birth parent.”); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:13(II) (2002 
& Supp. 2008) (“A contract purporting to require a birth parent to reimburse an intended adoptive parent for [living 
expense] payments under any circumstances . . . is void as against public policy.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39.1(e) 
(West 2002 & Supp. 2008) (payments by adoptive parents are non-refundable); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.837(6)(b) 
(West 2008 & Supp. 2008) (court’s only option is to dismiss the adoption petition). But see MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 710.54(11) (West 1995) (acceptance or retention of amounts in excess of those approved of by the court 
constitutes a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than ninety days or a fine or not more than 
$100, or both, for the first violation, and a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than four years or a fine 
of not more than $2,000, or both, for each subsequent violation); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-34(D) (West 2003 & 
Supp. 2008) (any person who makes payments that are not permitted is in violation of the Adoption Act and subject 
to penalties); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.055(D) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008) (the court may reduce the amount if 
it is unreasonable, or if disallowed, . . . the court may order that it be refunded); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-
3.2(A) (West 2007) (if some fees or charges are unlawful or unreasonable, the court may order reimbursement; 
persons wishing to pay birth mother living expenses must first obtain court authorization); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-
310(F) (1987 & Supp. 2007) (the court may approve an adoption while not approving unreasonable fees and costs); 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 3-703(a)(8) (2007) (prior to granting an adoption, the court must deny, modify, or order 
reimbursement of any unauthorized payment or unreasonable or unnecessary payments). 
68 See In re Adoption of Child by I.T., 397 A.2d 341 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1978) (court refused to dismiss adoption petition 
despite statutory violations because best interests of child outweighed any wrongdoing); In Matter of Anonymous, 
16 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1165 (N.Y. 1990) (adoption approved despite excessive and unlawful fees). But see ALA. 
CODE § 26-10A-23(b) (1992) (prior to payment, adoptive parents must file an accounting of all expenses, and 
payment may be made only with court approval or payments may be placed in escrow until court approval); 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 525/4.1(e) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009) (within fourteen days of payment of living expenses, the 
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C. Specific Monetary Caps 
Three states attempt to curb blurring of the lines between allowing payments of birth 
parent living expenses and baby selling by imposing specific dollar limitations on living expense 
payments that adoptive parents are permitted to make.69  For instance, Connecticut allows total 
birth parent living expenses of no more than $1,500 to be paid in connection with the placement 
of a child.70  Wisconsin caps living expenses at a more generous $5,000, but requires that such 
payments be “necessary to protect the health and welfare of the birth mother or the fetus;”  
precisely what qualifies as necessary under that statutory language has not yet been considered 
by Wisconsin’s courts. 71 
Perhaps the most instructive body of state law on imposing particular caps as a means of 
controlling the payment of birth parent living expenses in connection with adoptive placements 
is that in Ohio.  Before late 2008, Ohio was one of just a handful of states altogether disallowing 
the payment of birth parent living expenses in connection with the adoption of a child.72  Before 
2008, Ohio law allowed prospective adoptive parents to pay medical expenses incurred around 
the time of the child’s birth and legal expenses associated with the surrender and placement of 
the child,73 but all other payments to birth parents were prohibited as a violation of Ohio’s baby 
selling statute,74 which prohibits “any disbursements in connection with [a] minor’s permanent 
                                                                                                                                                             
adoptive parents must file a financial accounting report with the court); MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 710.54(10) 
(West 1995) (court will evaluate all fees and expenses and may disapprove of some if unreasonable);  
69 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-728c (West 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.055(C) (West 2005 & Supp. 
2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.913(1) (West 2008 & Supp. 2008). 
70 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-728c (West 2004). 
71 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.913(1) (West 2008 & Supp. 2008).  
72 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.055(C) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008) (“No . . . person . . . shall make or agree to 
make any disbursements in connection with the minor’s permanent surrender, placement, or adoption other than 
those specifically authorized by the statute.”).  The statute did not specifically authorize birth parent living expenses, 
and these expenses were, therefore, not permissibly covered by adoptive parents.  See id.   
73 Id.  
74 See id.   
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surrender, placement, or adoption. . . . ”75  In December 2008, however, the Ohio legislature 
lifted its ban on the payment of living expenses to allow prospective adoptive parents, through 
agencies or attorneys only, to pay birth mother living expenses not to exceed the sum of 
$3,000.76  Ohio adoption lawyers contend that the change is a positive one for Ohio, as Ohio 
couples were “losing babies” as Ohio birth mothers traveled out of state to give birth to and place 
their children in states that did allow some expenditures for housing.77  Ohio’s new law aligns it 
with that of Connecticut and Wisconsin, then, in attempting to strike a balance on the living 
expense issue.  Indeed, advocates of the new Ohio law specifically described it as a means of 
“help[ing] birth mothers and still maintain[ing] enough oversight to prevent adoptions from 
becoming sales. . . . ”78   
D. Limitation to the “Period of Confinement” 
A number of states limit the payment of birth parent living expenses, not with a 
reasonableness requirement or with a cap on permissible expenditures, but rather, by limiting the 
period of time for which such expenses may be covered by potential adoptive parents.79  Indiana, 
Illinois, New York, and Tennessee all regulate the payment of living expenses in this manner, 
allowing only the payment of rent, housing expenses, and the like within a specific, delineated 
period that ranges from the shortest of sixty days in New York80 to perhaps as long as six months 
                                                 
75 Id.  
76 Id. at § 3107.055(C)(9). 
77 Rita Price, Birth Moms Could Get Aid Under Bill: Ohio Loses Out on Adoptions over Living-Expenses Ban, Some 
Say, THE COLUMBUS DISPATCH, May 25, 2008, available at http://www.dispatchpolitics.com.  
78 Id.  
79 See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 525/4.1(a) (West 
2003 & Supp. 2009); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-109 
(West 2002 & Supp. 2008). 
80 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 2003 & Supp. 2009) (“reasonable and actual expenses for housing, 
maternity clothing, clothing for the child and transportation for a reasonable period not to exceed 60 days prior to 
the birth and the later of 30 days after the birth or 30 days after the parental consent to the adoption”).  
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in Indiana.81  Still other states—including Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Vermont—allow the 
payment of living expenses for a “reasonable time” only,82 with state courts left to define the 
precise meaning of the phrase in this context only under the press of actual litigation.83 
The idea behind these limitations based on an expense’s proximity to the birth may not be 
immediately obvious.  A glance at legislative history in the aforementioned states, however, 
indicates that states choosing this manner of regulating living expense payments to birth mothers 
are trying to maintain the economic neutrality of the adoption transaction for birth mothers 
whose employment abilities may be diminished for a portion of the pregnancy.84  In keeping with 
this goal, at least one scholar has articulated that rules setting forth short windows for the 
payment of birth parent living expenses should strive to closely track the “period of 
confinement” associated with pregnancy.85  Whether that is done by setting out a period of days 
or by designating that expenses may be paid only for a reasonable time, the purpose of the rule is 
to serve as a sort of substitute for wages or other sources of income the birth mother may not 
now receive because of the confinement associated with the pregnancy.86  To the extent a birth 
mother is unable to work during the final period of her pregnancy, the states allowing these 
                                                 
81 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-9(b) (West 2004 & Supp. 2008). The Indiana statute speaks in terms of trimesters and 
allows the payment of birth mother living expenses only in the second and third trimesters of pregnancy. Id. 
Furthermore, Indiana’s statutes limit the living expenses paid to a total of $1,000. Id. 
Illinois allows the payment of such expenses for up to 120 days before the birth mother’s expected due date 
and Tennessee allows the expenditures for a maximum of a ninety day period during the pregnancy. 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 525/4.1(a) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-109 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008). 
82 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2533(d) (West 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-310(F) (1987 & Supp. 2007); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15A, § 7-103(a) (2007).  
83 See generally Lucas, supra note 21, at 561–62 (stating that there are only a few reported cases regarding the 
permissibility of living expenses to provide guidance for adoptive parents and attorneys). 
84 Donnelly, supra note 57, § 6:20 (stating that no California court has ever defined “confinement” but that the 
apparent legislative intent is to refer to the period of time during which the birth mother is disabled or unemployable 
due to pregnancy).  
85 JOAN HEIFETZ HOLLINGER ET AL., ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE § 5.09 (1994).   
86 Donnelly, supra note 57, § 6:20 (stating that under California’s statute, the adoptive parents may pay the 
“expenses” of the birth mother, and, although lost income is not technically an expense, the payment of living 
expenses is meant to be a substitute for income during the period of confinement).  
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expenses during a short window essentially allow her to maintain housing even without a 
traditional source of income.87   
Virginia has taken very seriously the notion of living expenses as a substitute for wages 
that can no longer be earned due to the demands of pregnancy.88  But instead of relying on a 
sixty or ninety-day period before the birth of the child to appropriately limit these expenses, the 
Virginia legislature has expressly allowed adoptive parents to pay reasonable and necessary 
expenses for shelter, food, clothing and the like only on proof of the “written advice of her 
physician, [that] the birth mother is unable to work or otherwise support herself due to medical 
reasons or complications associated with the pregnancy or birth of the child.”89  Because not all 
pregnancies leave birth mothers unable to work for any significant period,90 the Virginia rule is 
more tailored to addressing the concerns that lead states to limit living expense payments 
temporally in the first place. 
New Hampshire and Minnesota are somewhat similar.  Both states’ statutes expressly 
provide for the payment of only necessary living expenses and do not delineate any particular 
window for the permissibility of these payments before the birth.91  At first glance, then, it would 
seem these two states should be categorized as those limiting the payment of living expenses by 
a determination of reasonableness or necessity rather than those employing a short window of 
time to impose a limitation.  In reality, however, perhaps these two states are best described as a 
hybrid of the two models.  Both New Hampshire and Minnesota allow only the payment of 
necessary expenses, but necessity in those statutes is defined in terms of maintaining a standard 
                                                 
87 Id.  
88 VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1218 (West 2002). 
89 Id.  
90 See BabyCenter Medical Advisor Board, Being Pregnant at Work (reviewed by Vicki Lee Edge), 
http://www.babycenter.com/0_being-pregnant-at-work_490.bc (last visited Feb. 22, 2010) (stating that if birth 
mother is a healthy woman having a normal pregnancy and working in a safe environment, she may be able to 
continue working until the day of delivery or close to it). 
91 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.55 (West 2007).   
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of living for the birth mother that is adequate when she is unable to maintain such a standard 
herself because of lost wages or income.92  Of course, it is likely in states regulating solely with a 
time period that the same expenses would be covered under each formulation of the rule.  After 
all, the demands of pregnancy for the vast majority of women typically only render a woman 
unable to be employed toward the tail end of the pregnancy.93  Both articulations of the rule, 
then, strive to rebuff charges of baby selling by limiting the permissibility of such payments to 
the “period of confinement.”  State statutes focusing on lost income rather than a specific number 
of days before birth are just more likely to match the period of confinement precisely. 
E. Outright Bans 
Finally, a very small number of states prohibit prospective adoptive parents from paying 
the housing costs of the birth mothers whose children they intend to parent altogether.94  With 
Ohio defecting in 2008 to a cap system,95 only five states today disallow the payment of living 
expenses entirely.96   
Texas law provides an instructive example of such a ban.  A criminal statute in Texas 
defines the offense of “sale or purchase of [a] child” as offering to accept, agreeing to accept, or 
accepting “a thing of value for the delivery of the child to another or for the possession of the 
child by another for purposes of adoption. . .”97  The statute goes on to list exceptions to “a thing 
of value” as that phrase is used here, including agency fees, medical expenses, legal expenses, 
                                                 
92 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.55 (West 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:13(I) (2002 & Supp. 2008) (authorizing 
the payment of “reasonable living expenses . . . which are needed to maintain” the birth mother’s standard of living).  
93 See Donnelly, supra note 57, § 6:20 (typically contemplates the last trimester of pregnancy and sometimes into the 
six weeks postpartum).  
94 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-213(1)(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 928(a) (2006); 
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-362(b) (West 2006); DeJesus v. State of Texas, 889 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. App. 1994); 
Thacker v. State of Texas, 889 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. App. 1994). 
95 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.055(C) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008). 
96 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-213(1)(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 928(a) (2006); 
MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-362(b) (West 2006); DeJesus v. State of Texas, 889 S.W.2d 373 (Tex. App. 1994); 
Thacker v. State of Texas, 889 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. App. 1994); In re Baby Girl D., 517 A. 2d 925 (Pa. 1986). 
97 TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.08 (2003). 
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and even “necessary” pregnancy-related expenses (which may be read to including living 
expenses) but only if such expenses are “paid by a child-placing agency.”  Thus, birth mother 
living expenses may be paid in Texas agency adoptions, though not in private adoptions.  There 
is no exception to the Texas baby selling statute which would permit the payment of living 
expenses directly from a prospective adoptive parent to a birthparent, even using an attorney as 
intermediary. 
In DeJesus v. State of Texas, the defendant birth mother was convicted of violating the 
Texas Penal Code for selling her child to her attorney, Thacker, the defendant in the sister case 
of Thacker v. State of Texas.98 The evidence showed that Thacker paid DeJesus $12,000 for a 
relinquishment of parental rights for five of her children aged newborn to four years old.  
DeJesus asked for a jury instruction that she should be found not guilty if the jury found that she 
received the money as a reimbursement for living expenses, including housing, food, and 
clothing, the trial court denied the jury instruction. The appellate court held that the trial court 
properly denied the instruction, as the payment of living expenses are not express statutory 
exceptions to the ban on “baby selling.” The Texas appellate court upheld the defendant’s 
conviction. 
In Pennsylvania, adoptive parents sought reimbursement of “unusual” fees paid to their 
intermediary agency after completion of an adoption.99  Those fees included $50 per week in 
birth mother housing expenses, paid not for the housing of the woman whose child they planned 
to adopt—for that would clearly violate Pennsylvania’s baby selling statute—but rather for 
                                                 
98 At the time DeJesus was decided, the Texas statute criminalizing baby selling did not allow for the payment of 
“necessary pregnancy-related expenses.”  Rather, exceptional payments were limited to agency, legal, and medical 
fees.  The pregnancy-related expense provision was added in 2001.  TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.08 (2003).  Still, 
this exception extends only to pregnancy-related expenses covered by a licensed adoption agency.  Thus, the 
payments from prospective adoptive parents’ attorney to birth mother in DeJesus would violate even the current 
Texas statute.  TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.08 (2003). 
99 In re Baby Girl D., 517 A. 2d 925 (Pa. 1986). 
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another pregnant woman planning to relinquish her child for adoption through the same 
agency.100  The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s order that the adoptive parents be 
reimbursed for these housing expenses, calling the arrangement an “attempted subterfuge” that 
would permit a birth parent to profit impermissibly from an adoption.101 
II. THE FAILURE OF EXISTING SOLUTIONS TO THE LIVING EXPENSES PROBLEM 
 
 The nearly overwhelming predilection of states to allow prospective adoptive parents to 
pay some birth mother living expenses is disturbing when one begins to seriously analyze both 
the impression these rules create and their real-world pragmatic effects.  The rules regarding 
birth mother living expenses help none of the players involved in domestic adoption.  Payments 
for housing and other related expenses send the wrong message about adoption, fostering an all 
too easy analogy to baby selling, and possibly even causing long-term damage to society in the 
form of exacerbating existing class and race divisions.  Birth parents, ironically, may also suffer 
from receipt of these payments, as they tend to interfere with the voluntariness of surrenders.  
The impact on prospective adoptive parents of the allowance of such payments is demonstrably 
significant and negative.  And because living expense rules make prospective adoptive parents 
less likely to pursue domestic adoption, they harm children as well. 
A. The Thin Line Between Child Sales and Housing Payments 
 
 One significant problem with a scheme of rules that generally allows the payment of birth 
mother living expenses is that the payment of these sums tends to obfuscate the already thin line 
between mere assistance and baby selling.102  Unlike other adoption-related expenses, allowing 
prospective adoptive parents to pay birth mother living expenses actually allows the birth mother 
to profit from the adoption transaction.  And while such profit may seem acceptable when the 
                                                 
100 Id. at 928. 
101 Id. 
102 See generally End Baby Commerce, Commentary, GAMBIT WEEKLY, June 10, 1999, at 7. 
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child is successfully placed and all members of the triad are pleased with the outcome, there are 
in fact, serious societal harms, most particularly along lines of race and class.   
 1. Living Expenses as Gray Market Activities 
To prohibit child trafficking, state statutes generally speak in terms of prohibiting persons 
from giving or receiving “money or other consideration or thing[s] of value”103 in connection 
with the adoption of a child.104  Medical expenses, legal expenses, and even living expenses 
incurred during the period of pregnancy and for a short time after the adoption are clearly 
covered, and thus prohibited, under the plain language of state baby selling statutes.  But these 
expenses are generally viewed as exempt from the ambit of baby selling prohibitions because of 
the need to protect the economic neutrality of the adoption transaction.105  The gist of this view is 
that a birth mother should not be placed in a better position by a pregnancy and match with an 
adoptive family with whom she has discussed relinquishing her child.106  At the same time, 
concerns about whether a birth mother would choose adoption were she to emerge from a 
pregnancy and adoptive placement worse off financially, particularly given the availability of 
                                                 
103 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-5-213(1)(a) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008) (“No person shall offer, give, 
charge, or receive any money or other consideration or thing of value in connection with the relinquishment and 
adoption. . . .”).   
104 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 568.175(1) (West 1999) (“The crime of trafficking in children is committed when 
one offers, gives, receives or solicits any money for the delivery or offer of delivery of a child to another person, 
institution, or other organization for purposes of adoption.”); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.9(1) (West 2001 & Supp. 
2008) (“A biological parent may not receive anything of value as a result of adoption. . . .”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
14:286 (West 2004) (“It is unlawful to sell or surrender a minor child to another person for money or anything of 
value, or to receive a minor child for such payment of money or anything of value.”); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 
603(a) (West 2002) (“A person may not sell, barter, or trade, or offer to sell, barter, or trade, a minor for money, 
property, or anything else of value.”).   
105 See Academy of California Adoption Lawyers, supra note 44.  The Academy of California Adoption Lawyers 
states that payments from adoptive parents to birth parents are for the purpose of making adoption a “financially 
neutral option for the birth mother,” rather than a money-making opportunity. See also Watson, supra note 44, at 
539. 
106 See Academy of California Adoption Lawyers, supra note 44. See also Donnelly, supra note 57, § 6:20. 
 25
abortion as an alternative,107 have led state legislators to err on the side of striving for economic 
neutrality.108 
 A further justification often espoused for allowing prospective adoptive parents to cover 
some birth parent living expenses during the period leading up to the birth and adoption is that 
prospective adoptive parents have a strong interest in adopting a healthy child.109  Ensuring that 
the birth mother is well cared for is the best way to promote the birth of a healthy baby.110  When 
it comes to medical expenses, for instance, this line of thinking is rather easily supported.  A 
birth mother who receives adequate prenatal care and competent medical assistance during the 
birth of the child is more likely to deliver a healthy newborn.111  Viewed through this lens, the 
payment of some pregnancy-related expenses by adoptive parents serves only to promote the 
health and safety of the birth mother, and by extension, the baby she carries.  Payments made 
solely to safeguard health and promote welfare of the birth mother and child do not often raise 
red flags.  Most would not argue that a prospective adoptive parent’s payment of the birth 
mother’s $5,000 hospital bill for the child’s delivery would even come close to baby selling.112  
Expenses related to health and safety are simply not often negatively perceived, likely because of 
adherence to the goal of financial neutrality for the birth mother in the adoption transaction. 
                                                 
107 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705 (1973). 
108 See Donnelly, supra note 57, § 6:20. 
109 See Hendrix v. Hunter, 110 S.E.2d 35, 38 (Ga. App. 1959); Barwin v. Reidy, 307 P.2d 175, 184 (N.M. 1957). See 
also 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 525/4.1(c) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009) (living expenses permitted only in those 
circumstances where there is a demonstrated need for the payment of such expenses to protect the health of the 
biological parents or the health of the child to be adopted).   
110 See Barwin v. Reidy, 307 P.2d 175, 184 (N.M. 1957) (reasoning that it is productive of the welfare of the child 
that the child and mother have adequate medical attention). For a discussion of the health risks of pregnancy, see 
Klinke, supra note 26, at 143–45. 
111 See Donald A. Rea, Family Law—Adoption: Do Laws Prohibiting Reimbursement to a Natural Mother for 
Reasonable Expenses Incurred During Pregnancy Truly Serve the Best Interests of the Child? In re Adoption No. 
9979, 323 Md. 39, 591 A.2d 468 (1991), 22 U. BALT. L. REV. 133, 138 (1992) (stating that the medical expense 
exception is permitted because it is deemed to directly benefit the child’s best interests).   
112 See generally Barwin v. Reidy, 307 P.2d 175, 184 (N.M. 1957) (reasoning that there is nothing inimical to public 
policy in allowing adoptive parents to pay the medical expenses of the birth mother).  
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 These legislative goals of economic neutrality and narrowing permissible adoption-
related expenses to those which affect the health or safety of the birth mother are nicely achieved 
when one considers medical, and even legal, expenses incurred in connection with adoption.  
These expenses can be definitively and demonstrably tied to the pregnancy, birth, and placement 
of the child.113  They are direct expenses connected solely with the birth and adoption.  Hospital 
fees associated with the child’s birth, for instance, would not be incurred absent the birth 
mother’s pregnancy and her decision to carry the baby to term.114  Legal fees associated with the 
placement of the child and finalization of the adoption would not be incurred absent the birth 
mother’s implementation of her adoption plan.115  These fees truly require expenditures which 
would not be made but for the continued pregnancy, birth, and subsequent adoption.  Allowing 
prospective adoptive parents to cover these expenses, then, truly does maintain the birth mother 
in a position such that she neither profits nor suffers economically as a result of the choices she 
makes.116 
 With living expenses, however, the same rationale is unpersuasive.  Those advocating the 
permissibility of living expense payments in connection with domestic adoption uniformly 
proffer the justification of creating financial neutrality for the birth mother in the adoptive 
placement.117  But such arguments consistently ignore the fact that prospective adoptive parents’ 
payment of the birth mother’s housing expenses almost certainly provides an advantage that the 
birth mother would not have absent the pregnancy.  Unlike medical expenses relating to birth, or 
legal expenses relating to the execution of a surrender, living expenses—particularly housing 
costs—are not expenses with any causal connection either to pregnancy or to adoptive 
                                                 
113 See Rea, supra note 111, at 138.  
114 See generally In re Adoption No. 9979, 591 A.2d 468, 473 (M.D. App. 1991). 
115 Id.  
116 See Academy of California Adoption Lawyers, supra note 44. 
117 Id. See also Watson, supra note 44, at 539. 
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placement.  Whether they are pregnant or not, whether they have created an adoption plan or not, 
and regardless of personal circumstances, all persons endure the hardship of either paying for 
adequate housing or relying on the charity of friends or social welfare programs.  Pregnancy does 
not transform that responsibility, because the responsibility is not one related to the birth or 
adoption plan of the birth mother, except perhaps during a short, and perhaps even rarely 
occurring,118 window during which a birth mother’s pregnancy-related health complications 
preclude her from working to earn income necessary to pay for housing.119  For the vast majority 
of pregnancies, the ability of a birth mother to charge prospective adoptive parents for the costs 
of living she would have otherwise had to bear makes for an anything but neutral transaction.  
Particularly in states without any dollar cap or time limit imposed on living expenses, 
prospective birth parents stand to reap relatively substantial financial gain through the deflection 
of financial responsibility for their housing needs.120  The gain may not come in the form of a 
cash infusion directly to the birth mother, but the financial gain is no less substantial when it is 
achieved through the birth mother’s indirect enjoyment of cost-free living, often limited only by 
a requirement that prospective adoptive parents cover only living expenses actually incurred.121  
With the rationale of fiscal neutrality gone, it is difficult to draw any meaningful line between 
the conduct of providing a housing benefit to a birth mother and simply giving her a cash 
payment of the same amount to use in any manner she wishes. 
 Moreover, the desire to protect the health and safety of the birth mother, and thereby her 
unborn child, is an equally weak argument in favor of allowing such a clear economic boon to 
                                                 
118 See Being Pregnant at Work, supra note 90 (if birth mother is a healthy woman with a typical pregnancy and 
working in a safe environment, she may be able to continue working until the day of delivery or close to it). 
119 See Donnelly, supra note 57, § 6:20.   
120 See ALASKA STAT. § 26-10-4.1 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-211(a) (West 2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
199.590(6) (West 2006); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-306(a) (1998); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-15-117(4) (West 
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121 See ALASKA STAT. § 26-10-4.1 (2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.560(6) (West 2006). 
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birth mothers.  Living expenses simply are not like medical expenses insofar as they cannot so 
clearly been cabined as impacting the health of the child to be adopted.122  Those who would 
permit the payment of living expenses argue that “the public policy behind permitting [living] 
expenses is the assumption that a pregnant mother who is housed and fed will give birth to a 
healthier baby than a mother who is not.”123  This assumes that the only possibilities are 
homelessness or a home provided by prospective adoptive parents, starvation or food provided 
by prospective adoptive parents.  Reality is likely to provide a much less stark contrast between 
alternatives.  And given that reality, a problem of line-drawing becomes obvious rather quickly.  
A whole panoply of needs may be viewed—albeit with a liberal lens—to affect the health and 
welfare of the birth mother, and therefore the fetus she carries.  Clothing, for instance, has been 
likened to shelter insofar as both may be viewed as impacting the health and welfare of the birth 
mother.124 
Are we then to sanction provision by adoptive parents of a halcyon environment and 
delectable foods for expectant mothers on the grounds these are beneficial to the 
child?  If medical science were to determine that stress during pregnancy was 
inimical to the fetus, and an expectant mother’s employment were causing her stress, 
would prospective adoptors be expected to employ an agency to find the mother a 
happier work environment, or perhaps simply support the mother during her 
pregnancy lest the added stress inhibit the baby’s development or effect his 
insufferable disposition?125 
 
The slippery slope from living expenses down to outright baby selling is indeed a steep one, and 
when such expenses are allowed based on a thin health or welfare justification, it is difficult to 
imagine why similar arguments could not be made just as persuasively for a host of disturbing 
                                                 
122 See In re Adoption No. 9979, 591 A.2d 468, 473 (Md. App. 1991).  
123 Adoption House, Inc. v. P.M., 2003 WL 23354141, *9 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2003). 
124 In re Adoption No. 9979, 591 A.2d 468 (Md. App. 1991) (lack of clothing could have an adverse effect on the 
health and welfare of the natural mother and unborn child as well); Id. at 481  (Eldridge, J., concurring) (arguing that 
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125 In re Baby Girl D., 517 A.2d 925, 929 (Pa. 1986). 
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expenses—a large, safe vehicle,126 an exercise club membership, and frequent massages.127  In 
short, allowing the payment of living expenses when they are neither but-for expenses of the 
pregnancy nor expenses that can seriously be said to affect the welfare of the child for whom 
adoption is considered makes the adoption a veiled transaction which comes alarmingly close to 
a child sale. 
 2. The Harm of the Victimless Crime 
 “Philosophically, a lot of people feel that the violation of adoption laws [in the form of 
impermissible payments to the birth mother, for instance] is a victimless crime.  The status of the 
child is improved.  The adoptive parents are getting what they want, and typically the mother 
who wants to place the child places the child.”128  Even if state law creates a situation in which 
prospective adoptive parents frequently straddle the thin line between merely covering a birth 
mother’s housing expenses and buying a baby, many would ask, “who cares?  What, precisely, is 
the harm?”   
Margaret Jane Radin, in her well-known piece Market-Inalienability, persuasively 
catalogues the potential harm to society as a whole flowing from commodification of infants.129  
Radin describes a number of harms, all injurious to the very notion of personhood itself.  One 
such harm is that commodifying infants means placing a dollar value on them, and these value 
determinations will be made in a manner “injurious to their personhood and to the personhood of 
                                                 
126 See Matter of Adoption of Alyssa, L.B., 501 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986) (considering adoptive parents’ 
payment for the purchase of an automobile for birth mother).  
127 In fact, the Academy of California Adoption Lawyers defined “pregnancy-related living expenses” to include 
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payment assistance. Academy of California Adoption Lawyers, supra note 44. 
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16, 1998 at C1.  
129 Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987). 
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those who buy and sell on this basis, exacerbating class, race, and gender divisions.”130  
Transported to the living expenses context, this theory seems to hold quite strongly.  There is 
already no doubt that birth mothers who will give birth to white infants are more highly sought 
after in the domestic adoption arena than are pregnant women who will deliver African-
American or mixed-race babies.131  This reality is likely to persist simply because more 
prospective adoptive families wish to raise white infants, likely owing to the fact that the vast 
majority of prospective adoptive parents are themselves white.132  There is probably little that 
can be done, at least until society moves further toward a racially neutral view of the family, to 
modify that demand.   
But allowing prospective adoptive parents to pay birth mother living expenses simply 
further striates existing racial divisions.  Because a birth mother’s receipt of living expenses is 
not a financially neutral transaction, as detailed above,133 white birth mothers are likely to be 
well-supported during pregnancy and even to financially benefit from cost-free housing during 
pregnancy—thereby improving their economic positions—while birth mothers in the racial 
minority are likely to continue unsupported.  The message that white infants and white birth 
mothers are worth more is precisely the type of perceptual injury to personhood that Professor 
                                                 
130 Id. at 1927. See also Barbara K. Rothman, Reproductive Technology and the Commodification of Life, 13 
WOMEN & HEALTH 95, 96–97 (1988) (arguing that commodification in the surrogacy context affects women’s self-
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131 See generally Julie Palermo, Whose Child is This? A Critical Look at International Adoptions that Fail, 20 
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133 See supra Part II.A. 
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Radin describes in the context of baby selling.134  The risk of the damage caused by the 
transaction is simply strong enough to break the link between the payment of living expenses and 
baby selling entirely by prohibiting the payment of housing and other related expenses of the 
birth mother in connection with adoption. 
B. The Infringement on Voluntariness 
 
Even aside from its tie to baby selling, society should be concerned about the payment of 
birth mother living expenses because of the serious questions state laws on this issue raise with 
regard to the voluntariness of birth mother consent, and thus, the integrity of the entire adoptive 
placement.135  Just how free is the surrender of a child for adoption given by an emotionally 
fragile and exceptionally poor woman who sees the possibility of economic reward as a way out 
of her situation?136  Prohibitions on baby selling were adopted years ago “to deter the potentially 
coercive effect of payments to expectant mothers at a time when the best interests of the child, 
and for that matter the mother and father, are most likely to be subordinated by greed or ulterior 
motives.”137 
Of course, there is not a serious question of voluntariness in every adoption case, and the 
existence of state law allowing prospective adoptive parents to cover birth parent expenses of 
any kind does not necessarily create a lack of consent.  But the risk of the coercive effects of 
payments is high, and it necessarily affects poor women disproportionately, as they are both most 
likely to consider relinquishing their children for adoption, and most likely to need and be 
                                                 
134 See Radin, supra note 129, at 1932 (arguing that a women’s attributes, such as height, eye color, race, 
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influenced by cash payments made to them.138  That class effect, in and of itself, should give us 
pause.  Professor Radin argues that the sale of “personal things” by those in poverty should 
necessarily be presumed to result from a lack of free choice.139  And “[t]o protect the integrity of 
adoption proceedings and to safeguard the best interests of the child,”140 every possible step 
should be taken to ensure birth mother voluntariness. 
C. The Discouragement of Quality Adoptive Parents 
 
One of the most controversial issues surrounding adoption, particularly in the last twenty 
years, is the growing trend of American parents seeking to adopt internationally rather than 
pursuing domestic adoption in the United States.141  The problem, as many see it, is that this 
decision to go abroad to build a family necessarily means that, at least for each child adopted 
internationally by American parents, a child in need in the United States is left without an 
adoptive home.142  This view is supported by recent statistics.  In the year 2002 alone, 
approximately 21,063 children from abroad were adopted into American families, an increase 
from the 11,303 in 1996.143  During that same period, however, domestic infant adoptions 
declined significantly, with experts estimating that in 2002, approximately 1,246 fewer babies 
were adopted by American families than in 1996.144  There are many, often complicated, reasons 
that prospective adoptive parents have increasingly begun choosing a global route when it comes 
to adoption.145  One of those reasons is most certainly the financial drain, and worse, financial 
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142 See id. at 715. 
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uncertainty surrounding domestic infant adoption.146  There is a strong economic incentive to go 
international.  And because living expenses paid to birth parents are almost always one of the 
most substantial items of cost in a domestic adoption,147 reevaluation of the propriety of these 
payments at a time of rather widespread dissatisfaction with the domestic adoption system seems 
long overdue. 
 Far and away the most significant downside of the infant domestic adoption scheme in 
this country, at least from the prospective adoptive parent perspective, is that the transaction has 
no guarantee of completion, even once the prospective parents expend large sums of money.148  
Domestic infant adoption these days costs an average of $40,000.149  And while the total cost of 
an international adoption typically comes in at a pricier $50,000,150 largely because of travel 
costs,151 it is still viewed in adoption circles as a more stable financial bet.152  In the international 
adoption arena, with very few exceptions, those who enter the process, pay the requisite fees, and 
are found to be suitable adoptive parents succeed in bringing a child into their families.  
International adoptions begun are said to complete roughly eighty-six percent of the time.153  
                                                                                                                                                             
States); Palermo, supra note 131, at 717 (stating that adoption is not a priority of public child welfare agencies, 
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146 See generally Lucas, supra note 21, at 555–56.  
147 See id. at 556; Gearino, supra note 7.  
148 See Hollinger, supra note 27, at 49.  
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(last visited Feb. 16, 2010). 
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There are never any guarantees surrounding the availability of a particular child for whom 
prospective adoptive parents begin the adoption process.  But even if that particular child is 
determined to be unavailable for adoption, another adoptable child is typically identified,154 and 
prospective adoptive parents generally pay a previously agreed-upon agency fee for a near 
certainty that they will return with a new member of the family.155 
 Domestic adoption, on the other hand, is fraught with uncertainty.156  And while the cost 
may appear lower,157 that apparent financial incentive to adopt domestically is almost entirely 
neutralized by evidence of final placement rates.158  Because adoption agencies are not 
compelled to report, and no government agency compiles statistics on failed adoptions,159 there 
is no perfect data detailing domestic adoption failure rates.160  Nonetheless, industry experts 
estimate that roughly half of prospective adoptive families experience at least one failed match 
before finalizing an adoption.161  Birth mothers who create adoption plans with prospective 
adoptive families or adoption agencies later decide to parent their children themselves nearly 
eighty percent of the time.162  And lest one assume that the ultimate fulfillment of a birth 
mother’s adoption plan is completely unrelated to the payment of her living expenses, “[l]ong 
and often bitter experience has repeatedly demonstrated that the birth mother who is most 
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financially demanding is also the birth mother who is most likely to fail to complete the adoption 
plan.”163 
 A birth parent change of heart is no doubt an emotionally devastating decision for 
prospective adoptive parents.  Unfortunately, it may be financially devastating as well.  The vast 
majority of expenses paid by prospective adoptive parents in connection with a domestic 
adoption—particularly birth mother living expenses—are paid before the birth of the child.164  
But a birth mother may not execute a surrender of parental rights or consent to an adoption until 
some period after the child is born.165  Thus, in almost all cases, when a birth mother changes her 
mind and decides to parent the child herself, living expenses have already been paid by the 
prospective adoptive parents, who now find themselves without the child they hoped to parent.166  
Still worse, distraught adoptive parents are almost always held to have no means of recovering 
the expenses they paid, either from the adoption agency involved or from the birth mother who 
has decided to parent.167  The financial risk of domestic adoption is simply too great for many 
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qualified prospective adoptive families to bear, and thus, they turn away from domestic adoption 
and toward other countries to build their families. 
Perhaps an even graver concern than the potential loss of adoptive parents to intercountry 
adoption, however, is the very real possibility that the cost of domestic adoption may lead to the 
loss of many quality adoptive families altogether.  In essence, the high cost of infant adoption in 
the United States may price many families out of the market for a child.168   
 1. Paid Today, Gone Tomorrow 
 The bulk of the financial uncertainty surrounding living expense payments made in 
connection with domestic adoption flows from the notion that they are paid in advance of the 
birth and generally not returned to the prospective adoptive parents under any circumstances.  
State law supports the payment of birth mother living expenses and provides prospective 
adoptive parents no means of recovering the monies they pay regardless of whether the 
birthmother ultimately places her child for adoption. 
If a birth mother perpetrates a fraud on a prospective adoptive family in order to reap 
financial reward, never intending to go through with the placement agreement she perfected or 
otherwise misrepresenting her status or intentions in a way that is designed to unjustly enrich her 
to the prospective adoptive parents’ detriment, state law uniformly permits the prospective 
adoptive parents to file suit against the birth mother for fraud.169  Where this cause of action 
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could be proven, the defrauded prospective adoptive parents would at least recover damages for 
the loss they sustained, including all sums paid to and on behalf of the birth mother, and likely 
other damages, including those for emotional distress.170   
In one particularly well-publicized case, Maya-Anne Mays worked with an adoption 
agency to be matched with prospective adoptive parents who might provide a loving home for 
the child she claimed to be carrying, a child whose soldier father she said was killed in Iraq.171  
Ms. Mays took money from three couples who desired to adopt her baby—$250 from one couple 
for unspecified expenses, $1,050 from another couple for rent, and nearly $12,000 for two 
months from a third couple.172  None of those families succeeded in adopting Mays’ baby.  In 
fact, it’s unclear whether there was any baby at all.  Mays contends that she delivered a baby 
stillborn, dropped it outside an Oregon hospital, and did not seek medical attention during or 
after the birth.173  Oregon officials did not believe her story; they prosecuted Mays for hatching a 
scheme to defraud area couples by faking pregnancy to induce payments of substantial living 
expenses.174  After Mays’ lawyer failed to present any evidence substantiating her pregnancy at 
trial, Mays was convicted and sentenced to a three-year prison term.175  Whether the couples who 
                                                                                                                                                             
intent of not consenting to or completing the adoption of the child); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-101-03(d) (West 
2000 & Supp. 2008) (prospective adoptive parent may seek to recover a payment if the parent or other person 
receives or accepts it with the fraudulent intent to prevent the proposed adoption from being completed). 
170 See Burr v. Board of County Com’rs of Stark County, 491 N.E.2d 1101, 1108 (Ohio 1986). See generally Steven 
J. Gaynors, Annotation, Fraud Actions, Right to Recovery for Mental or Emotional Distress, 11 A.L.R. 5th 88 
(1993) (damages for emotional distress may be recovered in fraud cases where the defendant should have been 
aware that his conduct involved an unreasonable risk of causing emotional distress).  
171 Calif. Woman on Trial for Adoption Scam, ASSOCIATED PRESS, MSNBC WIRE SERVICES, Sept. 16, 2004, 
available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6022964.  
172 Demian Bulwa, Woman Convicted of Adoption Fraud Insists She’s Pregnant Now, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 
SFGATE, Oct. 25, 2007, at B-1.  To the extent these payments were for Ms. Mays’ pregnancy-related living 
expenses, they were permissible expenditures under Oregon law.  OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.311(1) (West 2003 & 
Supp. 2008). 
173 Calif. Woman on Trial for Adoption Scam, supra note 171. 
174 Id.  That a person could profit from one of these schemes at all shows rather handily that allowable payments in 
connection with domestic adoption are not merely those directly related to the birth, but are essentially cash 
payments akin to those which would be paid for purchase of a commodity. 
175 Bulwa, supra note 172. 
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provided Mays with monies for living expenses ever recovered the funds of which they were 
deprived is unclear, but each of these couples could likely have pursued a civil suit against Mays 
had they desired to pursue such a course of action.176  Cases like that involving Maya-Anne 
Mays177 are certainly troubling, but in the end, prospective adoptive parents are well-protected 
by state laws on fraud.178 
 The real difficulty in this area is in establishing fraud in connection with the adoption 
plan a birth mother makes for her child.179  Making out such a claim requires proof of fraudulent 
intent.180  And while that intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence,181 it is rather difficult 
to come by.  Unless the alleged birth mother is not pregnant at all when she develops an adoption 
plan and accepts payments of living and other expenses from prospective adoptive parents, she is 
likely to have second thoughts and, in fact, to vacillate frequently in her decision-making 
regarding her unborn child.182  Indeed, most mental health professionals agree that while a birth 
mother may perfect an adoption plan and fully intend to stick with and place her child as the plan 
describes, the decision must be made all over again once the child is born.183  Under the 
circumstances that necessarily surround domestic adoptions, then, one would expect to see 
evidence of vacillation, doubt, and uncertainty as to a birth parent’s decision to relinquish a child 
                                                 
176 For the elements of fraud under Oregon law, see Riley Hill General Contractor, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 737 P.2d 
595 (Or. 1987).  
177 For a more recent, but strikingly similar story, see Mills, supra note 21. 
178 Of course, there are significant limitations to pursuing a fraud claim against birth mothers, who are typically poor 
and likely judgment proof.  See Kelly, supra note 136, at 17 (birth mothers are often poor, illiterate, and young). 
179 See John R. Maley, Wrongful Adoption: Monetary Damages as a Superior Remedy to Annulment for Adoptive 
Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20 Ind. L. Rev. 709, 709 (1987) (describing the difficulties faced by 
adoptive parents in recovering when birth parents act fraudulently). 
180 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 23 (2001). 
181 37 AM. JUR. 2D Fraud and Deceit § 496 (2001). 
182 See generally Carol Sanger, Separating from Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375, 441–43 (1996).  
183 See Susan Ayres, Kairos and Safe Havens: The Timing and Calamity of Unwanted Birth, 15 WM. & MARY J. 
WOMEN & L. 227, 279 (2009) (early decisions to make an adoption plan are often made, but until the point of 
delivery, there is typically no real emotional commitment to those decisions).  See also HOLLINGER ET AL., supra 
note 85, § 2.11[1][a] (stating that the hormonal and other physiological changes that occur may render the birth 
mother unusually susceptible to external pressures to retain her child). 
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for adoption.  As a result, any circumstantial evidence of fraud should be viewed skeptically, and 
proof of fraudulent intent ought to be more strongly demonstrated in the adoption context than it 
must be in the typical fraud case.  Furthermore, proof issues aside, most pregnant women 
perfecting an adoption plan are not acting with intent to defraud prospective adoptive parents in 
making the plan; they simply want the best for their babies and believe they are moving toward a 
positive future both for themselves and the children to whom they will give birth.184  That these 
women may later change their minds and choose to parent does not mean they ever possessed a 
fraudulent intent.  In short, it is the very rare domestic adoption case in which fraud is 
committed.  Cases like that involving Maya-Anne Mays do arise, but thankfully, rather 
infrequently. 
 In the garden-variety domestic adoption failure, then, there is no fraud, but simply a 
change of heart.  And in these cases, adoptive parents almost always find themselves with no 
child and no means of recouping the often substantial sums of money they have already 
expended, particularly when it comes to housing payments made on behalf of the birth mother 
during pregnancy.  Adoption agencies are generally well-insulated from the claims of 
disappointed prospective adoptive parents,185 largely because agency-drafted contracts expressly 
state that all fees paid to the agency in connection with an adoption are non-refundable under any 
and all circumstances.186  Moreover, many expenses paid by prospective adoptive parents are 
                                                 
184 See Ayres, supra note 181, at 279-80 (discussing difficulty of birth parent decision to relinquish); Hearings, 
supra note 4, at 17 (testimony of William Acosta) (testifying that birth mothers are often told that if they change 
their minds and choose to parent, they will be depriving “the child of a lifestyle that [they] could not hope to 
provide”). 
185 Kurt Mundorff, Children as Chattel: Invoking the Thirteenth Amendment to Reform Child Welfare, 1 CARDOZO 
PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS 131, 133 (2003) 
186 See e.g., Adoption Associates, Inc., Agency Policies, http://www.adoptassoc.com/about/agency_policies/, (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2010). 
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paid directly to third-party service providers.187  Housing may well be one such expense;188 in 
fact, it may be more logical in some cases for prospective adoptive parents to arrange to make, 
for instance, rental payments on behalf of a birth mother directly to the landlord, in part to ensure 
that only actual expenses are being covered.189  In these cases, the agency has no role in the 
payment of sums directly from the prospective adoptive parents to a third-party housing 
provider, and the agency cannot be called upon to refund living expenses paid if the adoption 
fails.190  Likewise, the third-party housing provider owes no duty to prospective adoptive parents 
with whom he has no contractual relationship; he has provided the service for which he was 
paid.191 
 If anyone owes a duty of reimbursement to prospective adoptive parents, it is the birth 
mother who received cost-free housing and chose not to complete her adoption plan.  The 
decision regarding the fate of the child is the birth mother’s to make,192 and almost no one would 
argue that she lacks the right to make whatever final decision she wishes.193  But if the birth 
mother chooses to parent the child, she has essentially received a huge financial benefit from 
prospective adoptive parents to whom she provided nothing but heartache in return.194  From a 
purely equitable standpoint, the end result of such a failed adoption should be to put the parties 
                                                 
187 See e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-13(c) (West 2003); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.9(2) (West 2001 & Supp. 2008); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.55 (West 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:13(I) (2002 & Supp. 2008); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 14-15-10(1) (2004); OHIO  REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.055(C) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 10, § 7505-3.2(B) (West 2007); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2533(d) (West 2001) (statutes provide the payments 
which must be reported to the court, which are predominantly to third-party service providers). See also Zierdt, 
supra note 2, at 34.  
188 IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.9(2) (West 2001 & Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.55 (West 2007); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 170-B:13(I) (2002 & Supp. 2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-10(1) (2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
3107.055(C) (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2533(d) (West 2001). 
189 Ralph F. Dublikar, Ethical Considerations in Adoption Law, 24985 NBI-CLE 55, 56-7 (2005). 
190 Richard A. Lord, Warranties: Introduction, 18 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §52:38 (2009). 
191 Id.  
192 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 71 (2003).  
193 See New York ex rel. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 195 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959); Pressman, 
supra note 162, at 33. 
194 See Klinke, supra note 26, at 120–21; Pressman, supra note 162, at 34–105. 
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back into their original positions.195  This would require a birth mother who received housing 
payments under an adoption plan she did not fulfill to reimburse prospective adoptive parents in 
the amount of the benefit she received.  Assuming no fraud exists, as is true in the vast majority 
of cases, a state law cause of action such as unjust enrichment could be used to pursue this 
recovery, and it may fit the bill quite well.196  The problem, simply stated, is that courts almost 
never charge a birth parent in a failed adoption with the duty to repay monies received from 
prospective adoptive parents who desired to adopt the child.197 
 Even for the lucky couple for whom a planned domestic adoption succeeds—with the 
birth parents executing surrenders in accordance with the adoption plan—prospective adoptive 
parents have a limited practical ability to have living expenses they paid in connection with the 
adoption reviewed in any meaningful way for reasonableness, necessity, or any other limiting 
standard.  Most states do require prospective adoptive parents to disclose all fees paid in 
connection with an adoption when they petition the court for finalization of the adoption.198  And 
some state courts have ordered intermediary agencies to reimburse prospective adoptive parents 
                                                 
195 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1515(2) (2006) (prospective parents to failed adoptions may sue for expense 
reimbursement and damages).  
196 See   Richard A. Lord, Rescission and Restitution: Quasi-Contractual Recovery, 26 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS 
§68:5 (2009).  
197 See, e.g., A.L. v. P.A., 517 A.2d 494, 498 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (holding that adoptive parents cannot 
recover any out-of-pocket expenses spent on the adoptive child while in the adoptive parents’ custody if the birth 
parents breach the “adoption contract” and regain control of the child). 
198 See ALA. CODE § 26-10A-23(a) (1992); ALASKA STAT. § 25.23.090(a) (2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-114(E) 
(2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-211(a) (West 2002); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8610 (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.132 
(West 2005 & Supp. 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-13(c) (West 2003); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-1511 (2006); 720 
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 525/4.1(e) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.9(2) (West 2001 & Supp. 
2008); KANS. STAT. ANN. § 59-2121(b) (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(6) (West 2006); LA. CH. CODE ANN. 
art. 1200(A) (West 2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-306(b) (1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54(7) 
(West 1995); MO. ANN. STAT. § 453.075(1) (West 2003); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.127 (West 2008); N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 170-B:19(V) (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-34(A) (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); N.Y. DOM. REL. 
LAW § 115(8) (McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-2-602 (West 2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-10(1) 
(2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-3.2(A) (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.311(1) (West 2003 & 
Supp. 2008); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2531 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-740 (1987 & 
Supp. 2007); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-1-116(b)(16) (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-140 (West 
2004 & Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 3-702 (2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-803(f) (West 2002); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.913(6) (West 2008 & Supp. 2008). 
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for fees paid which were in excess of the state standard.199  But those cases are exceptionally 
rare.  Courts almost never order expense reimbursement in a successful adoption at the 
finalization stage.200  The focus of the proceeding at that point simply rests elsewhere.  
Moreover, as previously discussed, many states find such reimbursement orders a violation of 
public policy.201  And, of course, birth mothers placing their children for adoption are typically 
poor women against whom any judgment is likely going to be virtually uncollectible.202   
As a result, whether they are successful in adopting the children delivered by the birth 
mothers with whom they are matched or not, prospective adoptive parents are highly unlikely to 
see the return of any monies they expend for birth parent living expenses.  And if their first 
attempt at adoption results in failure, which is statistically quite likely, many prospective 
adoptive parents do not have the financial means to start the adoption process anew after losing 
tens of thousands of dollars.  In the current legal landscape, a failed adoption quite often marks 
the end of a prospective adoptive parent’s journey. 
2. A Skewed Pool of Prospective Adoptive Parents Along Lines of Wealth 
 
                                                 
199 See In re Baby Girl D., 517 A. 2d 925 (Pa. 1986); see also J.F. v. D.B., 848 N.E.2d 873 (Ohio App. 9 Dist. 2006) 
(ordering biological parents in planned surrogacy to reimburse adoptive parents for monies expended after 
surrogates chose to parent the child); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 3-703(a)(8) (2007) (prior to issuing the final decree 
of adoption, the court must conduct an accounting, and must deny, modify, or order reimbursement of any payment 
or disbursement that is unauthorized by statute or is unreasonable or unnecessary when compared with the expenses 
customarily incurred in connection with an adoption). See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.055(D) (West 2005 & 
Supp. 2008) (the court may reduce the amount if it is unreasonable, or if disallowed, . . . the court may order that it 
be refunded); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-3.2(A) (West 2007) (if some fees or charges are unlawful or 
unreasonable, the court may order reimbursement). 
200 See End Baby Commerce, Commentary, GAMBIT WEEKLY, June 10, 1999, at 7. (“the state exercises very little 
oversight in determining what is ‘reasonable’”); Gabriel Escobar, “Lawyer’s Kidnap Case Spotlights Louisiana 
Adoption Laws” THE WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 16, 1998 at C1 (“just how carefully expenses are scrutinized [by 
state district judges] is an open question”). 
201 See e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 525/4.1(d) (West 2003 & Supp. 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 
710.54(6) (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.55 (West 2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 42-7-105(4) (2007); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-B:13(II) (2002 & Supp. 2008); N.J. REV. STAT. § 9:3-39.1(e) (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-10-103(c) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008). 
202 In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1238–49 (N.J. 1988).  
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That domestic adoption is too expensive is a relatively non-controversial assertion.  
Serious attempts need to be made to balance a free-market approach, under which only the 
wealthiest of couples will become parents through domestic adoption, with the needs of the 
hundreds of thousands of children available for adoption each year.  Reducing the expense for 
families pursuing domestic adoption would better serve the needs of our children.   
Living expenses of the birth parents are only one of the many expenses that arise in 
connection with domestic adoption.203  If any real effort were made to reform American adoption 
procedure to make it more palatable from a cost perspective, agency and attorney brokerage fees, 
as significant costs of a domestic adoption,204 must be reviewed as well.205  Nonetheless, birth 
parent living expenses often make up a very large portion of a domestic adoption budget.206  And 
as a result, the permissibility of these payments contributes to the size of the pool of prospective 
adoptive parents who are willing to consider, and can afford, domestic adoption. 
 Some may argue that prospective adoptive parents unable to afford to pay birth mother 
living expenses are too poor to adopt anyway, and thus, perhaps it is in the child’s best interest 
that such families are priced out of the adoption market.207  This argument fails to consider, 
                                                 
203 Lucas, supra note 21, at 555–56.  
204 See Pressman, supra note 162, at 33 (stating that the independent baby broker will offer to represent each 
prospective adoptive couple for a fee of $3,000, but the baby broker does not guarantee that the birth mother will 
choose the couple; the baby broker may send out twenty letters to introduce prospective adoptive couples to the 
same pregnant woman, and if the baby broker gets five replies, he has made “$15,000 and hasn’t helped any of these 
couples”).   For a sampling of agency fees in a domestic adoption, see, e.g., PremierAdoption.org, Domestic 
Program, http://www.adoptivefamilies.com/articles.php?aid=1685 (last visited March 1, 2010) (listing agency fees 
as ranging from $13,500 to $21,500, depending on adoptive family income). 
205 Id. See also Hearings, supra note 4; Klinke, supra note 26, at 118–19.  
206 See generally Lucas, supra note 21, at 555–56; Gearino, supra note 7.  
207 See Richard B. Wirthlin, American Public Attitudes Toward Infant Adoptions, in ADOPTION FACTBOOK IV: THE 
MOST COMPREHENSIVE SOURCE FOR ADOPTION STATISTICS NATIONWIDE 225 (2007) (fifty-state survey shows that 
U.S. public thinks that single mothers seeking to adopt who have an average annual income of $50,000 to $74,900 
will be “good mothers” at a much higher percentage rate than women earning $35,000 or less per year); National 
Commission of Children, BEYOND RHETORIC: A NEW AMERICAN AGENDA FOR CHILDREN AND FAMILIES 64 (1991) 
(for children to develop fully, their fundamental needs must be met: care and attention from loving parents, an 
adequate family income, good nutrition and basic healthcare, a quality education, adequate housing, and a safe 
neighborhood). But see D.C. CODE § 4-1410 (2008) (inability of adoptive applicants to pay for all or any part of such 
costs shall not be a disqualifying factor in determining whether applicants are suitable parents for the child); In re 
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however, that the average income of a family in this country is a mere $50,000.208  Reasonable 
birth mother living expenses of $1,500 per month for a period of six months, or a total of $9,000, 
represents nearly 20% of a typical family’s annual income, and may be very difficult for 
prospective adoptive parents to front at the start of an adoption.209  Such difficulties do not mean 
that these same prospective adoptive parents would be unable to adequately raise the child they 
adopt.  The cost of raising a child is borne slowly over time,210 and there are cost efficiencies and 
economies of scale inherent in adding to an existing family that do not exist when it comes to 
advancing a non-household member’s expenses of life for many months.211  Moreover, “[m]any 
homes with scarce financial resources are nevertheless adequate to provide the love, protection 
and support that children require.”212 
 With the American foster care system in crisis,213 one must also consider whether it may 
not be a positive development that some families wishing to adopt cannot afford to build families 
through domestic infant adoption; the hope is that such families will turn to the foster care 
system and to adopt therefrom at little or no cost.214  Unfortunately, the current foster care 
system is not an attractive alternative for many prospective adoptive parents, regardless of their 
                                                                                                                                                             
Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1249 (N.J. 1988) (American values do not allow the rich to use their money to circumvent 
the law).  
208 Carmen DeNavas-Walt, Bernadette D. Proctor, & Jessica C. Smith, U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population 
Reports, Income in the United States, in INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED 
STATES: 2007, 5 (2008). See also Hearings, supra note 4, at 4.  
209 See generally Klinke, supra note 26, at 148. 
210 DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, & Smith, supra note 208, at 9.  
211 Id.  
212 In re Baby Girl D., 517 A.2d 925, 927 (Pa. 1986). See also Hearings, supra note 4, at 4–22 (1977) (hearing 
findings show that adoptive couples are not “rich” but will endure financial sacrifices for the child and are often so 
desperate that they will pay any price and even commit crimes, including perjury, obstruction of justice, and 
conspiracy, for the chance to raise a child). 
213 The Pew Commission on Children in Foster Care, Fostering the Future: Safety, Permanence and Well-Being for 
Children in Foster Care, in ADOPTION FACTBOOK IV: THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE SOURCE FOR ADOPTION 
STATISTICS NATIONWIDE 279–80 (2007); Rycraft, supra note 3, at 351–52 (foster care is not meeting the needs of 
children, as it fails to provide safe and permanent families).   
214 Adopting a child out of the U.S. foster care system through a public agency will often come at no cost to the 
adoptive family. National Adoption Center, Adoption Financing Information: How to Cover the Costs, 
http://www.adopt.org/assembled/financing_more.html#foster (last visited Feb. 23, 2010).  Indeed, fost-adopt parents 
often receive assistance from the state for the children they take into their care. Id.  
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financial inability to pursue a private or agency adoption.  The rather scant possibility that a 
fostered child will become available for adoption215—children in state care are reunified with 
their natural parents and therefore become unavailable for adoption roughly 50% of the time216—
the likelihood that the child will suffer long-term effects of abuse and neglect,217 and the relative 
infrequency with which very young children are available for adoption218 makes the fost-adopt 
system an unacceptable alternative for many families. 
 In short, the risk of allowing birth parent living expenses to be paid in connection with a 
domestic infant adoption means that birth parents are likely to select adoptive parents who can 
pay these expenses over those who cannot.  Indeed, substantial evidence exists to demonstrate 
that birth mothers regularly engage in just this type of selective behavior—when they live in 
states that do not allow prospective adoptive parents to pay birth mother housing benefits, they 
flock to states more friendly in allowing these payments to give birth to and place their 
children.219  Thus, state law sanctioning payment of living expenses tends to discourage all but 
the wealthiest of families from pursuing the domestic adoption of an infant, thereby diminishing 
the pool of prospective adoptive parents and inhibiting the ability of loving and capable families 
                                                 
215 See Thomas C. Atwood, Nicole Ficere Callahan, and Virginia C. Ravenel, Judicial Leadership to Ensure Sound 
Permanency Decisions for Children in Foster Care: Practical Guidelines for Juvenile and Family Courts, in 
ADOPTION FACTBOOK IV: THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE SOURCE FOR ADOPTION STATISTICS NATIONWIDE 291 (2007) 
(stating that only 20% of all children in the foster care system have case plans aimed toward permanent adoption).  
216 Id.  
217 See The Pew Commission on Children in Foster Care, Fostering the Future: Safety, Permanence and Well-Being 
for Children in Foster Care, in ADOPTION FACTBOOK IV: THE MOST COMPREHENSIVE SOURCE FOR ADOPTION 
STATISTICS NATIONWIDE 279–80 (2007) (children entering the foster care system at an early age often lack the 
stability that promotes attachment and early brain development and as a result are more likely to face emotional, 
behaviorial, and academic challenges, and as adults, homelessness and unemployment).  
218 See Atwood, Callahan, & Ravenel, supra note 215, at 295 (stating that it can take up to 12 months from the date 
the foster child is removed from his or her home before the first permanent placement hearing is held).  
219 In Adoption House, Inc. v. P.M., 2003 WL 23354141, at *4–*5 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2003), a birth mother refused to 
agree to adoption in Pennsylvania because, at that time, Pennsylvania law did not permit the payment of birth 
mother living expenses.  She decided instead on a couple from New Jersey, a state in which living expenses were 
allowed.  Two years later, when the same birth mother sought an adopting couple for another child, she decided first 
on a couple from Louisiana, who later changed their minds at the hospital after learning the child was biracial.  The 
birth mother finally decided on a Delaware couple, as Delaware state law permitted the payment of living expenses.  
See also Zierdt, supra note 2, at 31–32.   
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to be candidates as adoptive parents through domestic adoption.  And while “financial 
considerations are certainly a factor, placement of children in adoptive homes should not rest 
solely on the wealth of the adoptors.”220  Such a result is clearly not in the best interest of the 
nearly 25,000 children relinquished in infant domestic adoptions each year.221 
D. The Misplacement of the Support Burden 
 
One of the most troubling features of state law allowing the prospective adoptive parents 
of a child to pay birth mother living expenses is that these rules place the burden of caring for a 
birth mother in necessitous circumstances on the shoulders of a party who, from a logical 
standpoint, should not be bearing it.  One scholar has warned, for instance, that if adoptive 
parents are not legally free to provide pregnant women with reasonable sums of money during 
pregnancy, the likely result will be “an epidemic of teen-age mothers necessarily on welfare.”222  
Aside from the fact that there’s no reason to believe the prediction has any merit—indeed, the 
percentage of persons on welfare in states such as Louisiana and Florida, whose liberal rules 
allow for the greatest payments of birth mother living expenses, is higher than that in 
Pennsylvania, a state which prohibits the payment of birth mother living expenses altogether—
shouldn’t the government bear more of the responsibility for taking care of its citizens than 
should a prospective adoptive parent who hopes for, but has no guarantee whatsoever of 
parenting a birth mother’s child?  The question of the propriety of the existence of social welfare 
programs in general is highly controversial, but as long as such programs exist, and their purpose 
is to protect the interests of the nation and state’s most needy citizens, birth mothers and their 
unborn fetuses seem to fall squarely within the domain of those eligible for government 
                                                 
220 In re Baby Girl D., 517 A.2d 925, 927 (Pa. 1986). 
221 See Sally Kalson, International Adoptions by Americans Get Really Tough, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Post-
gazette.com, Mar. 15, 2009, available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/09064/955756-82.stm (last visited Feb. 
25, 2010) (American children in need of adoption disadvantaged because more adoptive parents are looking abroad). 
222 Rea, supra note 111, at 145. 
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assistance.  In short, states have an interest in protecting their birth mother citizens.  Prospective 
adoptive parents have no such duty.  But the very existence of state laws which allow 
prospective adoptive parents to legally cover birth mother living expenses means that, for all 
practical purposes, it is adoptive parents who bear the burden of birth mother care that the state 
or federal government would likely otherwise be bearing.223 
In the Medicaid context, an evaluation of the proper placement of the burden of caring for 
needy birth mothers and their fetuses has been made.  Because pregnant women considering 
adoption for their unborn children are often living in poverty, their medical expenses in 
connection with the pregnancy are typically covered by Medicaid.224  In the case of In re 
Adoption of Baby Boy M.,225 the Kansas trial court, at finalization of the adoption proceeding, 
ordered the adoptive parents to reimburse Medicaid for expenses covered by that program for the 
birth mother’s medical expenses in delivering the child.  The appellate court reversed, holding 
that no law required the adoptive parents to make this reimbursement, and in the absence of any 
such provision, the adoptive parents held no such duty.226  Michigan allocates responsibility for a 
birth mother’s medical expenses even more clearly; prospective adoptive parents are only 
permitted to pay medical expenses incurred by the birth mother in connection with an adoption if 
those expenses are not covered by Medicaid.227 
In essence, states generally place the burden of caring for the medical needs of the birth 
mother during pregnancy on the government, rather than on adoptive parents, even in a 
                                                 
223 The placement of the support burden on prospective adoptive parents, typically strangers to the birthmother and 
not predisposed to bestow upon her any gratuity, leads to the nearly inescapable conclusion that the payments made 
are really made for the child itself. 
224 States which elect to cover the medically needy under their Medicaid plans are required to cover children under 
age eighteen and pregnant women who, except for income and resources, would be eligible as categorically needy. 
See U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Centers of Medicare and Medicaid Services, 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MedicaidEligibility/01_Overview.asp#TopOfPage, (last visited Feb. 25, 2010).. 
225 In re Adoption of Baby Boy M.,18 P.3d 304 (Kan. App. 2001). 
226 Id. 
227 MI. ST. § 710.54(3)(b) (1995). 
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successful adoption.  To do otherwise in the context of living expenses—where the possibilities 
may be government assistance with housing through a program of social welfare or private 
coverage of birth mother living expenses by prospective adoptive parents—is inconsistent with 
the rules governing Medicaid and difficult to justify. 
 When the birth mother is married at the time of the adoptive placement (which is not all 
that rare), there are even more significant questions about the propriety of the placement of the 
burden of paying her living expenses on the shoulders of prospective adoptive parents.  The only 
rational reason for allowing the birth mother to receive monies on which to live from the 
prospective adoptive parents—and to allow her to, at the same time, avoid a serious charge of 
baby selling—is that these monies pay for the birth mother to live during a period for which she 
is unable to work, typically only a lengthy period if there are complications in the pregnancy.  
The pregnancy of the birth mother should not interfere with her husband’s ability to work, 
however.  And in every state, spouses have a duty to support each other financially during 
marriage, a duty which is taken quite seriously and enforced with some regularity even while 
marriages are ongoing.228  Thus, a married birth mother is already owed a primary duty of 
support by her husband.  Allowing prospective adoptive parents to pay her living expenses 
without caveat shifts the primary obligation for the birth mother’s support from her spouse to 
typically unrelated adoptive parents.  Essentially, they allow the husband of a birth mother to 
profit from the adoptive parents—at least, if he is living in the same home with his wife—while 
simultaneously abdicating his own responsibility for her support. 
III. PROHIBITION:  THE ONLY ADOPTION-SAVING ALTERNATIVE 
                                                 
228 See e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 98 (West 2009) (“Married persons owe each other fidelity, support, and 
assistance.”); CAL. FAM. CODE § 720 (West 2009) (“Husband and wife contract toward each other obligations of 
mutual respect, fidelity, and support.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §46b-37 (West 2010) (“It shall be the joint duty of 
each spouse to support his or her family”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13 § 502 (West 2010) (duty to support a spouse rests 
upon the other spouse);  MONT. CODE ANN. §40-2-102 (West 2009).    
 49
 
Domestic adoption is facing a serious crisis.229  The success rate of planned placements is 
abysmal.  Adoptive parents are defecting to intercountry adoption in masses.  And the 
requirement that prospective adoptive parents pay exorbitant fees to adopt makes domestic 
adoption impossible for many couples.  Indeed, the President of the National Council for 
Adoption, an agency advocacy group, recently remarked that “you don’t need a lesson in 
economics” to understand that the adoption marketplace has created perverse consequences, 
particularly related to race.230  Indeed, something akin to a price schedule has emerged for white 
babies, distinct from that applicable to racial minorities.231   
The American system of private and agency adoption needs to be reformed dramatically.  
A modest, yet transformative place to start in re-regulating the baby market232 is with a ban on 
prospective adoptive parents’ payment of birth family living expenses. 
Time has demonstrated that less conservative reform will be ineffective at solving the 
problems plaguing domestic adoption.  Reasonableness and necessity limitations have not 
succeeded, nor have small dollar caps on living expenses.  “Because less than two percent of 
unmarried women are placing their babies for adoption, they now have the option to be very, 
very selective.”233  Indeed, they have profited – not merely subsisted – from the existing 
domestic adoption landscape.  Banning the payment of living expenses in connection with 
adoption would send a strong message distinguishing adoption from baby selling,234 and would 
                                                 
229 See Mansnerus, supra note 24, at A1. 
230 Id. 
231 Id.  
232 Michele Goodwin, The Free-Market Approach to Adoption:  The Value of a Baby, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 61 
(2006) (describing the current American adoption model as “resembl[ing] an unregulated marketplace in children”). 
233 Mansnerus, supra note 24, at A1.  
234 See generally Andrea B. Carroll, Incentivizing Divorce, 30 CARDOZO  L. REV. 1925, 1967-73 (2009) (on the 
expressive function of rules in the family law arena). 
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increase the likelihood that more prospective adoptive parents would foray into domestic 
adoption, serving not only those adoptive parents, but also children in need of homes.235 
The black market for babies was gutted nearly fifty years ago by the creation of relatively 
uniform state law prohibiting baby selling.  With domestic adoption currently facing serious 
challenges, the time has come to eliminate the gray market activities236—specifically the 
payment of birth family living expenses—as well. 
                                                 
235 There is a risk that eliminating the living expense windfall would lead more pregnant women to select abortion.  
See generally STEPHEN COLEMAN, THE ETHICS OF ARTIFICIAL UTERUSES:  IMPLICATIONS FOR REPRODUCTION AND 
ABORTION 74 (Ashgate Pub. Ltd. 2004) (describing sociological influences on the decision between adoption and 
abortion).  This risk may be quite real, but it is unquantifiable, and fear of it is no longer a sufficient reason to 
continue a system demonstrated over time to be seriously flawed. 
236 See Mansnerus, supra note 24, at A1. 
